Three Theories of Substantive Due Process by Conkle, Daniel O.
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
2006
Three Theories of Substantive Due Process
Daniel O. Conkle
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, conkle@indiana.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Conkle, Daniel O., "Three Theories of Substantive Due Process" (2006). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 166.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/166
THREE THEORIES OF
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS*
DANIEL 0. CONKLE"°
Substantive due process is in serious disarray, with the Supreme
Court simultaneously embracing two, and perhaps three, competing
and inconsistent theories of decisionmaking. The first two theories,
historical tradition and reasoned judgment, have explicit and
continuing support in the Court's decisions. Under the theory of
historical tradition, substantive due process affords presumptive
constitutional protection only to liberties that are "deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition." By contrast, the theory of
reasoned judgment is far more expansive, permitting the Court to
identify rights independently, through a process that amounts to
philosophical analysis or political-moral reasoning. The third
theory, evolving national values, is a theory that may be implicit in
Lawrence v. Texas and that finds support by analogy in recent
Eighth Amendment cases. Under this approach, substantive due
process protects values that command widespread contemporary
support, as evidenced by legal developments and societal
understandings that may change over time. In this Article, I offer a
detailed account of each of these three theories, explaining the
decisionmaking methodology that each requires for the
identification of unenumerated constitutional rights. The Article
also develops and applies three criteria of evaluation, grounded in
relevant considerations of constitutional policy: majoritarian self-
government, judicial objectivity and competence, and functional
justification. I contend that each theory can be defended as a matter
of constitutional policy but that, on balance, the most defensible
approach is the theory of evolving national values.
* Copyright © 2006 by Daniel 0. Conkle.
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INTRODUCTION
Nothing in constitutional law is more controversial than
substantive due process. Not only does the Supreme Court invoke
this doctrine to resolve deeply contested questions of political
morality, but the Court has yet to agree upon a theory of
decisionmaking that can explain and justify its rulings. Each of the
Court's rulings is important in its own right, and each warrants
academic commentary on that basis. Lawrence v. Texas,' for
example, is a landmark decision for sexual liberty and the
advancement of gay rights. Yet as the Court's substantive due
process decisionmaking continues apace, its overall doctrine demands
more comprehensive evaluation, and this Article proceeds at that
level. Using Lawrence as a point of departure, I will offer a close
reading and a theoretical examination of the Court's contemporary
doctrine. I also will suggest that Lawrence, viewed from this broader
1. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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perspective, not only reveals a state of profound doctrinal confusion
but also includes untapped insights-or at least unexplored hints and
suggestions-that might inform a substantial reconceptualization and
reformation of substantive due process. If my thesis is correct, it
promises enhanced coherency and legitimacy for this embattled area
of constitutional law.
In its historic decision in Lawrence, the Supreme Court declared
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment2 protects
the substantive "liberty" of consenting adults to engage in
homosexual conduct.' In so doing, the Court overruled Bowers v.
Hardwick,4 which had derided such a claim as "facetious."5 Academic
commentators had been harshly critical of Bowers.6 I myself, in the
wake of Bowers and in light of the Court's continuing support for Roe
v. Wade,7 once argued that Bowers represented "the death of
substantive due process as a principled doctrine of law."8 One might
suppose that by overruling Bowers, the Court has now put matters
aright. Indeed, Lawrence has been praised as a victory for gay rights
and, more broadly, a victory for liberty.9 That it is, but Lawrence
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
4. 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
5. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194.
6. For a sampling of this critical commentary, see Anne B. Goldstein, History,
Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v.
Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988); David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and
Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 800 (1986); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of
Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989); Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1431 (1992). For additional citations, see Earl M. Maltz, The Court, the
Academy, and the Constitution: A Comment on Bowers v. Hardwick and Its Critics, 1989
BYU L. REV. 59, 60-61 n.4.
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759 (1986) ("Again today, we reaffirm the general principles
laid down in Roe .... ).
8. Daniel 0. Conkle, The Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 IND. L.J. 215,
242 (1987).
9. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence
v. Texas, 2002-03 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21 (applauding Lawrence on the basis of a broadly
libertarian interpretation of the Court's decision); Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence,
88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1137 (2004) ("Whatever its shortcomings, for lesbians and gay
men, Lawrence is a breakthrough."); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The
"Fundamental Right" That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1895, 1899
(2004) (suggesting that "Lawrence may well be remembered as the Brown v. Board of gay
and lesbian America" and arguing, more broadly, that it is a "pathmarking decision" that
"significantly alter[s] the historical trajectory of substantive due process and thus of
liberty"). The Court's decision has attracted a range of commentary, mostly but not
entirely favorable. See, e.g., Colloquium, The Boundaries of Liberty After Lawrence v.
Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447 (2004); Symposium, Equality, Privacy, and Lesbian and
Gay Rights After Lawrence v. Texas, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057 (2004); Symposium, Gay
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does not stand alone, and, from a broader doctrinal perspective, the
ruling highlights the conceptual chaos of modern substantive due
process. The Supreme Court's welter of decisions and its confusing
doctrinal standards have emboldened the Court's critics, who view
the "doctrine" of substantive due process as little more than a judicial
charade, an excuse for selective and unprincipled "legislating from
the bench." Lawrence has done nothing to alleviate these concerns.
If anything, it has compounded the problems of doctrinal clarity and
judicial consistency, because Lawrence suggests that the Supreme
Court may now endorse, simultaneously, three different-and
inconsistent-theories of substantive due process.
The first theory-the theory of historical tradition-is that
substantive due process affords presumptive constitutional
protection' ° only to liberties that are " 'deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition.' "" The Court embraced this approach in
Bowers,2 and it explicitly reaffirmed it as recently as 1997, in
Washington v. Glucksberg,3  which refused to recognize a
constitutional right 4 to physician-assisted suicide. 5 Under this type
of historical inquiry, Bowers and Glucksberg were correctly decided.
In Lawrence, the Court repudiated Bowers, but not Glucksberg,
suggesting that the historical approach might still be controlling in
certain contexts.
The second theory is the theory of reasoned judgment.
According to this theory, substantive due process rights are not
limited by historical tradition. Instead, the Supreme Court is free to
identify rights independently, through a process that amounts to a
type of philosophical analysis or political-moral reasoning. Under
this approach, the Court itself evaluates the liberty interest of the
Rights After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1017 (2004); Symposium, Privacy Rights
in a Post Lawrence World: Responses to Lawrence v. Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J.
263 (2004).
10. When I say that a liberty is afforded "presumptive constitutional protection," I
mean that governmental intrusions on the liberty are presumptively invalid and trigger
serious judicial scrutiny, something more than a deferential review for minimal rationality.
11. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (quoting Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
12. See id.
13. 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
14. Following the Court's own terminology, I use the term "right" to include an
individual interest that warrants presumptive as opposed to absolute constitutional
protection. See supra note 10; see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 768 n.10 (Souter, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (noting the Court's conventional terminology but indicating
that he would prefer to "reserv[e] the label 'right' for instances in which the individual's
liberty interest actually trumps the government's countervailing interests").
15. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735 (majority opinion).
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individual and weighs it against competing governmental concerns,
determining on this basis whether the liberty interest deserves
protection as a constitutional right. The Court applied this approach
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 6
reaffirming the "central holding" of Roe v. Wade7 not only as a
matter of precedent but also, in part, on the basis of "reasoned
judgment."' 8 In so doing, the Court independently examined and
evaluated the liberty interest of a woman seeking an abortion, and it
concluded that this interest warrants special constitutional
protection. 9 In Lawrence, the Court discussed Casey with approval,
seemingly endorsing Casey's reasoned judgment methodology." But
Lawrence also included a historical inquiry, with the Court
questioning the reasoning of Bowers on its own terms.21 More
generally, Lawrence did nothing to explain how the theory of
reasoned judgment might be reconciled with the competing approach
of historical tradition.
These first two theories have dominated the Supreme Court's
decisionmaking, and Lawrence appears to confirm a continuing role
for each. At the same time, Lawrence also suggests the possible
emergence of a third theory. After discussing the long history of
sodomy regulation, the Court conspicuously turned to more recent
developments, citing an "emerging awareness" concerning the proper
scope of personal liberty and noting that "our laws and traditions in
the past half century are of most relevance here. '2 The Court cited
these developments in part to support its historical critique of Bowers
and in part to support its own reasoned judgment that Bowers
reflected an impoverished understanding of human liberty. The
Court thus linked its discussion to each of the two prevailing theories
of substantive due process. 23  But this discussion also planted the
seeds for the potential emergence of an altogether different theory, a
theory of evolving national values.
According to this third theory, substantive due process is
informed by history, but it also includes a progressive dimension.
More specifically, substantive due process protects a set of evolving
16. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Casey, 505 U.S. at 853.
18. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849.
19. See id. at 846-53.
20. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571, 573-74 (2003).
21. See id. at 567-73.
22. Id. at 571-72.
23. See infra Part IV.B.
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national values, values that command widespread contemporary
support, as evidenced by legal developments and societal
understandings that may change over time. Although the Court's
opinion in Lawrence was ambiguous at best, the theory of evolving
national values strongly supports the Court's decision. At the same
time, this third theory is plainly at odds with each of the preexisting
approaches.
These three competing theories promote radically different
understandings of substantive due process and of the Supreme
Court's authority to identify unenumerated constitutional rights. In
this Article, I will discuss the Court's two prevailing theories,
identifying their strengths and weaknesses as a matter of
constitutional policy. I then will discuss the theory of evolving
national values that may be implicit in Lawrence, and I will argue that
this theory, properly elaborated and refined, is superior to either of
the Court's preexisting approaches. Thus, I will contend that
substantive due process should not be confined to historical liberties,
but that reasoned judgment, standing alone, cannot justify the
recognition of a constitutional right. Instead, substantive due process
rights should be limited to rights that are supported not only by the
Supreme Court's political-moral judgment but also by an objective
determination of contemporary national values. I will discuss how
the Court should ascertain the content of these values, and I also will
address additional factors that the Court should consider in its
decisionmaking.
In Part I, I will offer a brief history of modern substantive due
process, highlighting the ebbs and flows of the Court's "privacy" and
"liberty" decisions. In Part II, I will discuss general considerations of
constitutional policy, considerations that will guide my evaluation of
the three competing theories. Part III will evaluate the two theories
that have dominated the Court's decisionmaking: the theory of
historical tradition and the theory of reasoned judgment. Part IV will
discuss Lawrence, examining those portions of the Court's opinion
that relate to these two theories as well as the Court's suggestive
reliance on evolving values. In Part V, I will elaborate, evaluate, and
defend the evolving national values approach. In the course of this
discussion, I will contend that the appropriate methodology under
this theory is similar to that which the Court employs in Eighth
Amendment capital cases, including the Court's recent invalidations
[Vol. 85
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of the death penalty for mentally retarded and juvenile offenders. 4 I
also will explain how foreign and international law plays into the
analysis. Finally, I will offer concluding observations, noting the
implications of my argument for existing precedents but emphasizing
that my focus is primarily on the future.
I. MODERN SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: UNENUMERATED
RIGHTS OF "PRIVACY" AND "LIBERTY"
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no state "shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." 5 This language appears to afford
constitutional protection that is purely procedural, requiring only that
the government provide the "process" that is "due" before it deprives
a person of life, liberty, or property. By its terms, the language
suggests no limitation on procedurally proper deprivations, nor does
it authorize the recognition of substantive constitutional rights. As
Professor John Hart Ely famously suggested, "substantive due
process" can be seen as "a contradiction in terms-sort of like 'green
pastel redness.' "26 But despite the strength of this textual argument,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected it. Instead, the Court has
infused the Due Process Clause with substantive content. Focusing
especially on the word "liberty," it has declared for itself the power to
define otherwise unenumerated constitutional rights, rights that are
protected from governmental deprivation, no matter the procedure.27
24. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (mentally retarded offenders); Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (juvenile offenders).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fifth Amendment constrains the Federal
Government with its own Due Process Clause, the wording of which is substantially
identical. See id. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provision raises very similar issues,
but the Fourteenth Amendment has been the primary vehicle for the Supreme Court's
substantive due process decisionmaking, and it will be my focus in this Article.
26. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 18 (1980); see John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional
Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 552 (1997) (offering a detailed analysis of various arguments by
which substantive due process might be derived from the constitutional text, but
concluding that "the textual plausibility of the various derivations of substantive due
process are uniformly negative" and that none of them provides "a natural understanding
of the language"). But cf. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1333 (3d ed. 2000) ("[T]here is a reasonable historical argument that, by 1868, a
recognized meaning of the qualifying phrase 'of law' was substantive."); Harrison, supra,
at 553-55 (leaving open the possibility of a "term of art" meaning of the Due Process
Clause that, by 1868, might have included limited substantive content).
27. In addition to the Due Process Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or
Immunities Clause as well as the Ninth Amendment sometimes have been invoked to
support the judicial recognition of substantive constitutional rights not otherwise
delineated in the constitutional text. According to the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
20061
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For the Supreme Court of a century past, substantive due process
protected the "liberty" of contract, as exemplified by the Court's 1905
decision in Lochner v. New York.28 In this notorious case, the Court
invalidated a New York statute that established maximum hours for
bakery employees.29 The Court found that the statute violated the
Due Process Clause by denying bakery employers and employees the
right to determine contractual rights and duties for themselves?0
Over the next thirty years, the Supreme Court closely examined-and
frequently invalidated-a broad range of economic regulations,"
thereby promoting and protecting the economic philosophy of laissez
faire. In the 1930s, however, the Supreme Court dramatically
reversed course.32 Soon, the Court was categorically renouncing the
judicial activism of the Lochner era.33 Indeed, at least by the 1960s, it
appeared that the Court had rejected substantive due process
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Ninth Amendment
provides that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Id. amend. IX. For
competing judicial views concerning the meaning and relevance of the Ninth Amendment,
compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-93 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(arguing that the Ninth Amendment supports the Supreme Court's recognition of
individual rights not otherwise enumerated in the Constitution), with id. at 518-20 (Black,
J., dissenting) (contending that the Ninth Amendment was enacted not to enhance the
authority of the federal judiciary but to protect state powers from federal invasion), and
id. at 529-30 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Black and suggesting that
Justice Goldberg's argument "turn[s] somersaults with history"). For academic
commentary taking an expansive view of the Ninth Amendment as a rights-protecting
provision, see RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 234-52 (2004); CALVIN R. MASSEY, SILENT RIGHTS: THE
NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION'S UNENUMERATED RIGHTS (1995). For
commentary taking a more narrow view, see Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the
Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 597 (2005); Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning
of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 331 (2004); Thomas B. McAffee, The Original
Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1215 (1990).
28. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
29. Id. at 64.
30. See id. at 53-54.
31. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
500-03 (15th ed. 2004).
32. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); see also Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (foreshadowing the Court's impending change of direction).
33. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) ("The day is gone
when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike
down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be
unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought."); Lincoln
Fed. Labor Union v. Nw. Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 535, 536 (1949) (noting that
although the constitutional doctrine of Lochner and comparable cases "was for some years
followed by this Court," the Court more recently "has steadily rejected the due process
philosophy" of that period).
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altogether. In its 1963 decision in Ferguson v. Skrupa,34 for example,
the Supreme Court declared that although "[t]here was a time when
the Due Process Clause was used by this Court to strike down laws
which were thought unreasonable, that is, unwise or incompatible
with some particular economic or social philosophy,"35 that doctrine
"has long since been discarded. 36
Only two years after Ferguson, however, in Griswold v.
Connecticut,37 the Supreme Court invalidated a state law that banned
the use of contraceptives, as applied to married couples.38
Emphasizing the sanctity and intimacy of marriage, the Court
disavowed Lochner and claimed to rely on "penumbras" emanating
from the Bill of Rights, penumbras justifying -the recognition of a
constitutional "right of privacy" that protected the marital conduct in
question.39 Such a right could not fairly be inferred from the Bill of
Rights n however, and it seemed plain that substantive due process
was again at work." Indeed, the Court in Griswold reaffirmed-
purportedly on other grounds-two precedents from the Lochner era,
Meyer v. Nebraska42 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.43 Meyer and
Pierce had extended substantive due process "liberty" to protect not
only the "calling" of teachers' but also the right of parents to direct
34. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
35. Id. at 729.
36. Id. at 730. One substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause clearly had not been abandoned: the notion that this clause "incorporates"
various provisions of the Bill of Rights for application to the states, including substantive
provisions such as the First Amendment. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48
(1968). When I refer to substantive due process, however, I am excluding the Court's
doctrine of Fourteenth Amendment incorporation and am referring instead to substantive
constitutional doctrine grounded neither directly nor by virtue of incorporation on any
constitutional language more specific than the Due Process Clause itself.
37. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
38. See id. at 485-86.
39. See id. at 481-86.
40. Cf. id. at 509-10 (Black, J., dissenting) ("I get nowhere in this case by talk about a
constitutional 'right of privacy' as an emanation from one or more constitutional
provisions.").
41. In hindsight, one can see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), as a
forerunner to Griswold, both in its protection of an unenumerated liberty relating to
reproduction and in its attempt to defend this liberty without resort to substantive due
process. Thus, in the course of invalidating a compulsory sterilization requirement for
certain habitual felons, the Court in Skinner called procreation "one of the basic civil
rights of man" and "a basic liberty," id. at 541, but it relied on equal protection, not
substantive due process, as the formal basis for its constitutional ruling. See id. at 538-43.
42. 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-83.
43. 268 U.S. 510 (1925); see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-83.
44. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.
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the education of their children.45 Taken together with these early
precedents, Griswold suggested that the Court was protecting matters
of personal choice within conventional-and traditionally state-
supported-family relationships.46
Within a decade, however, it became clear that the newly
discovered "right of privacy" had a far more expansive reach. In its
1972 decision in Eisenstadt v. Baird,47 the Court extended Griswold to
protect access to contraceptives even outside the confines of
marriage, asserting that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."48
And a year later, in Roe v. Wade,49 the Court boldly declared that the
right of privacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."5  In Eisenstadt, the
Court struggled to avoid express reliance on substantive due
process,51 but it was more candid in Roe, attributing the right of
privacy to "the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty
and restrictions upon state action. 52
Roe brought modern substantive due process into full flower.
Governmental intrusions on the right of privacy triggered strict
judicial scrutiny, and they typically could not survive this review. The
Court invalidated a broad range of contraceptive and abortion
regulations, including waiting periods for abortion and special
requirements of informed consent.53 It also found that the right of
45. See id.; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
46. Cf Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (citing substantive due process and its
protection of marriage as an additional ground, beyond equal protection, for invalidating a
ban on interracial marriage).
47. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
48. Id. at 453.
49. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
50. Id. at 153. The Court went on to announce elaborate constitutional guidelines for
each of the three trimesters of pregnancy. See id. at 162-66. In a companion decision, the
Court considered and invalidated a variety of abortion regulations. See Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179 (1973).
51. The Court asserted that the statute violated equal protection by distinguishing
between single and married persons in a manner that could not satisfy rational basis
scrutiny. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 446-55.
52. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
53. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986) (invalidating abortion reporting and informed consent requirements as well as
special regulations for post-viability abortions); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (invalidating an abortion ordinance regulating informed
consent and parental consent, imposing a twenty-four-hour waiting period, requiring
[Vol. 85
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privacy protected other personal choices concerning family and
marriage relationships, thereby reaffirming and extending the
rationale of Meyer, Pierce, and Griswold.54
By the end of the 1980s, however, after years of intense political
battles in the context of judicial appointments and otherwise,55 the
right of privacy had passed its zenith and begun a descent. The
Supreme Court's 1986 ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick,56 refusing to
protect intimate homosexual conduct, appeared to ignore the logical
implications of the Court's privacy precedents, especially Eisenstadt
and Roe.57 Three years later, in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services,58 the Court's fractured decision suggested a weakening of
abortion rights and the potential that Roe soon might be abandoned
altogether. 9 Meanwhile, the Court was offering mixed results-and
hospitalization for second trimester abortions, and mandating the humane and sanitary
disposal of fetal remains); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)
(invalidating contraceptive regulations prohibiting distribution to minors under the age of
sixteen and precluding distribution to adults except by licensed pharmacists); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (invalidating various abortion regulations,
including a requirement of spousal consent). The Court did approve some abortion
restrictions, including parental consent requirements (but only if accompanied by judicial
bypass procedures) and prohibitions on governmental funding. See, e.g., Planned
Parenthood Ass'n of Kan. City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (upholding several
abortion regulations, including a parental consent requirement that included an
appropriate judicial alternative); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding "Hyde
Amendment" restrictions on federal reimbursement for abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding state law restrictions on abortion funding).
54. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (invalidating economic
restrictions on the right to marry and noting that "the right to marry is part of the
fundamental 'right of privacy' implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause"); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidating a housing
ordinance that limited the occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single nuclear
family, holding that the ordinance violated the substantive due process rights of other
relatives who wished to live together). See generally Developments in the Law-The
Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156 (1980) (offering an extended analysis
of substantive due process and other constitutional doctrines as they bear on family-
related issues in various contexts).
55. See Conkle, supra note 8, at 237-40.
56. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
57. See Conkle, supra note 8, at 221-37.
58. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
59. Extending its abortion funding precedents, the Court in Webster approved a
prohibition on the performance of abortions by state employees or in state facilities, even
if patients paid for the abortions themselves. See id. at 507-11. More generally,
addressing other provisions in the law, four Justices stated or implied that Roe v. Wade
should be substantially modified or overruled outright, and a fifth, Justice O'Connor,
suggested that she might be open to reconsidering Roe if and when the question was
directly presented. See id. at 517-21 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White
and Kennedy, JJ.); id. at 532-37 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); id. at 525-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
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contested reasoning-in the context of family and marriage
relationships. 6
In 1990, the Court extended substantive due process to a new
arena, end-of-life decisionmaking, but the Court's ruling was
measured, and its opinion reflected the right of privacy's declining
constitutional status. Thus, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health,6 the Court found that "[t]he principle that a
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior
decisions."'62 But the Court's terminology and reasoning had shifted.
Citing Bowers with approval, the Court conspicuously rejected the
"right of privacy" nomenclature and with it the strict scrutiny that
would follow. Instead, the Court found only that the interest in
refusing medical treatment was a specially protected "liberty interest"
under the Due Process Clause, an interest that triggered serious
judicial review but not the strong presumptive invalidity of strict
scrutiny." Applying a balancing approach, the Court concluded that
in the case of a person who was no longer competent, substantive due
process did not prevent a state from insisting that the person's desire
to terminate treatment be established by clear and convincing
evidence.6'
Two years later, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,65 the Court returned to the question of
abortion. To the surprise of many, a five-four majority reaffirmed the
"central holding" of Roe,' but the Court reconceptualized and
weakened the constitutional status of abortion rights. As in Cruzan,
the Court spoke of a protected liberty interest, not the right of
privacy," and it abandoned strict scrutiny in favor of a less protective
judgment); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (further extending the abortion
funding cases to uphold a restriction on abortion counseling within federally funded family
planning programs).
60. Compare Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (fractured decision
rejecting a claim of parental rights asserted by the alleged biological father of the child of a
married woman, with the Court upholding a state law presumption that the child was
fathered by the woman's husband), with Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding that
the right to marry extends to some degree even to prison inmates and invalidating a prison
regulation that could not be defended on the basis of rehabilitation or security concerns).
61. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
62. Id. at 278.
63. See id. at 278-79 & n.7.
64. See id. at 279-87.
65. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
66. See id. at 853.
67. See id. at 846 ("The controlling word in the cases before us is 'liberty.' ").
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balancing approach, one that precluded abortion regulations only if
they prohibited pre-viability abortions or otherwise imposed an
"undue burden" on abortion decisionmaking prior to viability.6
Under this newly minted standard, the Court concluded that some of
its post-Roe decisions had gone too far and should be overruled.69
More generally, the Court found that the states, within the limits of
the undue burden test, should be free to encourage and promote
childbirth over abortion. 0
More recently, the Supreme Court's substantive due process
decisions have run the gamut. The Court's 1997 decision in
Washington v. Glucksbergt refused to recognize a constitutional right
to physician-assisted suicide. Distinguishing Cruzan and Casey, the
Court found no special liberty interest and, as a result, no need for
anything more than a deferential review of the challenged law.72
Three years later, by contrast, the Court in Troxel v. Granville73
reaffirmed and invigorated parental rights, ruling that substantive due
process gives presumptive protection to the visitation decisions of
custodial parents, even their decisions to preclude visitation by
grandparents.74 In another 2000 decision, Stenberg v. Carhart,75 the
Court relied upon Casey to invalidate a "partial birth abortion"
prohibition. The Court found the law infirm because it was broadly
worded and because it did not include an exception for women facing
non-life-threatening health risks.76
68. See id. at 869-79 (plurality opinion). In Casey, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter wrote a joint opinion that was a majority opinion in certain parts and a plurality
opinion in others. Of the six remaining Justices, two urged stronger constitutional
protection for the right to abortion and four urged weaker protection. See id. at 911-22
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 922-43 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); id. at 944-79
(Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part); id. at 979-1002 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and by
White and Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). As a
result, the joint opinion stated a controlling "middle ground" even when it took the form
of a plurality opinion.
69. See id. at 881-87 (plurality opinion) (overruling various holdings in City of Akron
v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), and in Thornburgh v. Am.
Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)).
70. See id. at 869-79, 881-87, 899-900.
71. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
72. See id. at 728-35.
73. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
74. See id.
75. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
76. See id. at 929-46. The Supreme Court is revisiting this issue in pending challenges
to the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. IV 2004)), which likewise fails to include
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And in 2003, of course, Lawrence v. Texas77 found and protected
a liberty interest in intimate homosexual relationships, an interest
that the Court had readily dismissed less than two decades earlier.
Eschewing a more narrow ruling based on equal protection,78 the
Court self-consciously (and, to many, surprisingly) elected to decide
the case on substantive due process grounds, a choice that permitted
and required the Court to revisit and overrule Bowers.79 In the course
of its analysis, the Court spoke of privacy as well as liberty, but it did
not resurrect the "right of privacy" of old, complete with the strict
scrutiny that would follow. Instead, as in Cruzan and Casey, the
Court in Lawrence applied a somewhat more lenient balancing
approach. Even so, the Court scrutinized the challenged sodomy
prohibition with care, not only invalidating the law but also
suggesting, more generally, a clear presumption favoring the special
liberties of substantive due process.8 0
II. GENERAL CRITERIA OF EVALUATION
As I have just explained, the contemporary Supreme Court has
shifted its terminology from the "right of privacy" to "liberty," and it
has replaced strict scrutiny with a more open-ended balancing test. In
so doing, the Court has formally and significantly moderated the
doctrine of substantive due process. At the same time, however, the
Court's increasingly flexible approach is more malleable than its
previous doctrine, making it all the more obvious that the Court is
picking and choosing the liberties that it deems worthy of special
protection. And the Court continues to be bold and aggressive, albeit
on a highly selectively basis. In Stenberg, for example, the Court
invalidated a "partial birth abortion" prohibition despite the broad
an exception for non-life-threatening health risks and which lower courts have invalidated
on the basis of Stenberg. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 126 S. Ct. 1314 (2006) (mem.) (granting
certiorari to review Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005)); Gonzales v.
Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2901 (2006) (mem.) (granting certiorari
to review Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc., v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir.
2006)).
77. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
78. The challenged law prohibited homosexual but not heterosexual sodomy, creating
a strong argument that the law was invalid under the equal protection reasoning of Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574-75; id. at 579-85 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in the judgment). For suggestions that an equal protection ruling in
Lawrence could have had broader implications than might be apparent, see Pamela S.
Karlan, Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447, 1458-63 (2004); Tribe, supra note 9, at
1908-09 n.56.
79. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574-75, 578.
80. See infra Part IV.
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political sentiment that favors such a ban."1 And in Lawrence, the
Court reached out to overrule an existing precedent, and a relatively
recent one at that, 2 thereby thrusting itself once again onto the
cultural battlefield of contemporary America.
That substantive due process continues to flourish is hardly
enough to justify the doctrine's constitutional legitimacy. 3  The
Court's decisions-from Lochnerg4 to Lawrence-have little or no
support in the constitutional text. "Liberty" is a very fine thing, but
only its deprivation "without due process of law" violates the text of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor is there any persuasive evidence
that the framers and ratifiers of the Due Process Clause, despite their
chosen language, nonetheless intended to protect the substantive
liberties that the Court has elected to privilege. Likewise, and
perhaps more to the point, there is no persuasive evidence that these
liberties were embraced by the original, objective public meaning 5 of
the clause. 6 It seems plain that substantive due process grants
constitutional protection to rights that are neither enumerated in the
text nor grounded in the original meaning of the Fourteenth
81. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); id. at 979 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(noting that the Court's decision had the effect of repudiating comparable prohibitions in
some thirty states).
82. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
83. On the various meanings and interrelated components of constitutional
legitimacy-legal, sociological, and moral-in the context of judicial decisionmaking, see
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1813-42,
1847-51 (2005).
84. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
85. According to Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes Paulsen, originalist theories of
constitutional interpretation have evolved and matured over the last several decades, with
the focus gradually shifting from the "original intent" of the framers to the "original
understanding" of the ratifiers and then on to the "original meaning" of the constitutional
text. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the
Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1134-48 (2003). Endorsing the
"original meaning" approach, Kesavan and Paulsen explain that it "asks not what the
Framers or Ratifiers meant or understood subjectively, but what their words would have
meant objectively-how they would have been understood by an ordinary, reasonably
well-informed user of the language, in context, at the time, within the relevant political
community that adopted them." Id. at 1144-45 (footnote omitted); see id. at 1127-33,
1139-48.
86. One might creatively argue otherwise, but only by reading the original meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment at an extremely general-and therefore largely
unconstraining-level of abstraction. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence's
Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88
MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1051-58 (2004) (contending that the Court's decision in Lawrence can
be defended under a "legal process" reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's original
meaning).
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Amendment. Instead, the Court is protecting values that emerge
from a process of nonoriginalist judicial decisionmaking.87
Needless to say, the identification and protection of
unenumerated, nonoriginalist constitutional rights by the unelected
Supreme Court-with the Court nullifying legislative judgments on
fundamental questions of political morality-is a highly controversial
practice. As a result, it is hardly surprising that some have
condemned the entire enterprise of substantive due process, calling it
an unjustified judicial usurpation of political power and a flagrant
87. Even though the Supreme Court's particular decisions cannot be traced to the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, one might argue, more generally, that
the original meaning supports the Court's recognition of unenumerated rights that were
not specifically contemplated when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. An
originalist argument of this sort might rely not only on the Due Process Clause but also on
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, perhaps read in conjunction with the Ninth
Amendment. Professor (now Judge) Michael W. McConnell, for example, has argued that
the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, read alongside the Due
Process Clause, supports the protection of unenumerated rights identified in accordance
with the theory of historical tradition. See Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and
the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665, 691-98. More controversially, one
might argue that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment supports the judicial
recognition of a broader set of evolving constitutional rights. See ELY, supra note 26, at 28
(contending that "the most plausible interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
is ... that it was a delegation to future constitutional decision-makers to protect certain
rights that the document neither lists, at least not exhaustively, nor even in any specific
way gives directions for finding"); cf. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79 (stating that the
framers and ratifiers of the Due Process Clause did not presume to know "the components
of liberty in its manifold possibilities," leaving it to "later generations" to determine when
"laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress"). See generally
Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1161-67
(1987) (arguing that the founding generation, including the framers and ratifiers of the
Ninth Amendment, intended the judiciary to protect unenumerated natural rights,
including rights that might be newly discovered).
In effect, historical claims along these lines amount to originalist arguments for
nonoriginalist judicial decisionmaking. Thus, even under the approach of historical
tradition, as discussed by McConnell, the Supreme Court is required to look beyond the
constitutional text and its original meaning. See McConnell, supra, at 695 (noting that
rights protected as a matter of historical tradition "may change as society changes").
Likewise, of course, the more expansive theories of substantive due process also take the
Court beyond the text and original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
As Kesavan and Paulsen have explained, originalism comes in various forms, but,
in its essence, originalism "maintain[s] that constitutional interpretation should be
constrained by the 'original intent' of the Framers, the 'original understanding' of the
Ratifiers, or the hypothesized, objective 'original meaning' of the Constitution's text."
Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 85, at 1127. For present purposes, the key word in this
definition is "constrained." In my view, the Court's substantive due process
decisionmaking is not meaningfully constrained by the original intent, the original
understanding, or the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result, the
Court's decisionmaking is best described as nonoriginalist, and it is properly evaluated as
such.
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violation of the basic principle of majoritarian self-government.88 But
even in the midst of our contemporary culture wars, categorical critics
of substantive due process are remarkably few in number. To be
sure, the Supreme Court's particular decisions are hotly contested,
both in dissenting opinions and in the broader political community.
But substantive due process, in one form or another, has been
endorsed or accepted by a wide range of contemporary Justices,89 and
there likewise appears to be broad political support for at least a
limited judicial role in protecting unenumerated constitutional
rights.9" It seems that the language and original meaning of the Due
Process Clause have been overtaken by a contemporary consensus
that the Supreme Court should protect, as constitutional rights, not
only rights that were originally contemplated when the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted but also other rights that somehow call out
for judicial protection.
Taking this consensus as a given, the debatable question is not
whether the Supreme Court should maintain a doctrine of substantive
due process.91 Rather, the question is how this doctrine should be
formulated and applied. Even so, this latter inquiry has implications
for the more general question of the legitimacy of substantive due
process. Some conceptions or theories of substantive due process
88. The most prominent such critic undoubtedly is Robert H. Bork. See ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 31-32,
110-26, 180 (1990); see also, e.g., Nelson Lund & John 0. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas
and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1557 (2004) (calling substantive due process
"the most anticonstitutional branch of constitutional law").
89. On the current Supreme Court, only Justices Thomas and Scalia have suggested
that they might be prepared to repudiate substantive due process categorically. See, e.g.,
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(leaving open the possibility "that our substantive due process cases were wrongly decided
and that the original understanding of the Due Process Clause precludes judicial
enforcement of unenumerated rights under that constitutional provision"); Albright v.
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 275-76 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting "the proposition that
the Due Process Clause guarantees certain (unspecified) liberties" but acknowledging that
"this Court's current jurisprudence is otherwise").
90. This political support can be traced in part to 1987, when, after highly publicized
hearings, the Senate refused to confirm Robert H. Bork's nomination to the Supreme
Court. Professor Laurence H. Tribe has described this episode as a national "seminar on
constitutional law" and "a virtual national referendum" on the Constitution's protection
of unenumerated rights. See Tribe, supra note 9, at 1902 n.28.
91. As Professor Richard B. Saphire has written, "it is hard to know what to say to
someone who [completely rejects substantive due process]," because "it is difficult to
imagine anything less probable in the modern world of constitutional jurisprudence than
the prospect that the Court (anytime soon) will repudiate its substantive due process
doctrine." Richard B. Saphire, Doris Day's Constitution, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1443, 1469-
70 (2000).
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may be more defensible than others, and, indeed, if none is
defensible, then the consensus favoring substantive due process might
itself be put in question.92
Particular conceptions or theories of substantive due process can
be evaluated under three criteria. 93 First, how or to what extent can
the Court's decisionmaking be reconciled with the principle of
majoritarian self-government?94 Whatever its continuing salience in
other contexts, Professor Alexander M. Bickel's "countermajoritarian
difficulty"95 is alive and well-both as a matter of constitutional
theory and as a matter of popular debate-when the Court invokes
substantive due process to invalidate legislation and thus to repudiate
92. As indicated earlier, I believe that substantive due process is properly regarded as
a nonoriginalist constitutional doctrine. See supra note 87. But even if I am mistaken in
that conclusion, the analysis that I am about to develop might be relevant and helpful
nonetheless. Thus, even if the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment could be
read to justify substantive due process, the original meaning might not resolve the more
specific question of how the Supreme Court should formulate and apply this doctrine; that
is, it might not resolve the methodological question of how the Court should determine
the content of substantive due process rights. Cf MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 58 (1994) (arguing that "[tihe
originalist approach ... leaves ample room for the play of competing views about how the
Court should resolve indeterminate inquiries into original meaning"); Saphire, supra note
91, at 1445-46, 1454-59 (noting that the distinction between originalism and
nonoriginalism is not clear-cut, at least not when originalism is conceived as broadly as
Professor Perry and others have lately conceived it). Conversely, even if the original
meaning did provide clear guidance on the substantive due process methodology that the
Court should utilize, the Court might not agree that it should be confined to that original
meaning. To the extent that the Supreme Court either cannot or will not rely on the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to answer the question of methodology,
of course, it necessarily will resolve this question by other means. And in so doing, the
Court would do well to consider criteria of the sort that I describe in the text.
93. Needless to say, there may be other criteria as well.
94. This principle is fundamental and longstanding in the American constitutional
system, tracing its ancestry to the Declaration of Independence itself. See THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("Governments are instituted
among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed .... ). As the
late Professor John Hart Ely explained, constitutional amendments have repeatedly
expanded the franchise and thereby have "substantially strengthened the original
commitment to control by a majority of the governed." See ELY, supra note 26, at 7.
Although Ely agreed that there are limitations on this commitment, he concluded that
"rule in accord with the consent of a majority of those governed is the core of the
American governmental system." Id. But cf Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty,
and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 535 (1998) (conceding the importance of
political accountability but contending that its primary purpose is not so much to serve
majoritarianism as to advance liberty in a constitutional system that includes a judicial
branch empowered to protect individual rights).
95. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962).
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the judgments of elected officials.96 ' Let us call this first criterion of
evaluation the criterion of majoritarian self-government.
Second, how or to what extent does the Court's methodology
provide a basis of decisionmaking that is appropriate and fitting for
judges? Courts are not "naked power organ[s]."97 Rather, as Justice
Cardozo insisted, their task is that "of a translator, the reading of
signs and symbols given from without."98  Judicial decisionmaking
should be principled and consistent. It should be based upon
objectively determined values, not merely the judges' own,99 and the
determination of these governing values should be within the judicial
ken. Let us call this second criterion the criterion of judicial
objectivity and competence.'00
Third, how or to what extent does the Court's decisionmaking
serve an important function in contemporary American government?
As a nonoriginalist constitutional doctrine, substantive due process
requires a contemporary justification, a justification based on the
function that it serves. Even if substantive due process can be
reconciled with the principle of majoritarian self-government and
96. For a general discussion of the countermajoritarian difficulty, its influential role in
contemporary constitutional theory, and an argument that this difficulty has been
overstated, see DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING
CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 142-51
(2002).
97. Courts "are bound to function otherwise than as a naked power organ; they
participate as courts of law." Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1959).
98. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 174 (1921).
99. To be sure, judges cannot completely immunize their judicial decisionmaking from
their personal beliefs and values. As Cardozo conceded, "We may try to see things as
objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see them with any eyes except our
own." Id. at 13. Even so, and despite the claims of legal realism, judicial objectivity has
been and remains a fundamental legal norm and a professional ethic that responsible
judges embrace and strive to honor. Cf William P. Marshall, Constitutional Law as
Political Spoils, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 525, 537 (2005) ("The problem with wholly
succumbing to the realist vision ... is that it completely abandons the notion that judges
should at least aspire to decide cases on grounds other than their own pre-existing
philosophical or political dispositions.").
100. As Professor William P. Marshall has explained, there is a growing political
perception, both on the left and the right, that the Supreme Court does not honor this
criterion, and this perception has triggered a damaging and polarizing "downward spiral"
of ideological battles over Supreme Court nominations. Marshall, supra note 99, at 541;
see id. at 527-41. See generally Symposium, Jurocracy and Distrust: Reconsidering the
Federal Judicial Appointments Process, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 331 (2005) (offering other
perspectives and additional commentary). The Court cannot by itself resolve the judicial
nominations problem, but it can facilitate its potential resolution by adopting
decisionmaking methodologies that honor and (re)affirm the importance of judicial
objectivity and competence, even-and perhaps especially-in the resolution of
controversial constitutional questions.
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even if it can be conducted in a manner befitting the judicial role,
there is no reason to embrace it unless it advances or improves
contemporary governance and policymaking in the United States.
We can label this final criterion the criterion of functional
justification.'0 '
Each of these three criteria is a matter of degree. Moreover, the
relative importance of each criterion, as compared to the others, is a
matter of debate. Nevertheless, these criteria establish a useful
framework for evaluating competing theories of substantive due
process, including the theories of historical tradition, reasoned
judgment, and evolving national values.
III. THE THEORIES OF HISTORICAL TRADITION
AND REASONED JUDGMENT
At least prior to Lawrence, °2 two theories dominated the
Supreme Court's decisionmaking: historical tradition and reasoned
judgment. In its 1986 decision in Bowers, °3  and again in
Glucksberg,'° decided in 1997, the Court insisted-and emphasized-
that substantive due process protects only those liberties, narrowly
and specifically defined, that are "'deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition.' "105 Under this theory, neither homosexual
conduct nor physician-assisted suicide qualified for constitutional
protection. Falling midway between these two rulings, however, was
the Court's 1992 decision in Casey,0 6 reaffirming Roe v. Wade's
101. What Professor Bickel wrote of judicial review in general is especially fitting in the
context of substantive due process:
The search must be for a function which might (indeed, must) involve the making
of policy, yet which differs from the legislative and executive functions; which is
peculiarly suited to the capabilities of the courts; which will not likely be
performed elsewhere if the courts do not assume it; which can be so exercised as to
be acceptable in a society that generally shares Judge [Learned] Hand's
satisfaction in a "sense of common venture"; which will be effective when needed;
and whose discharge by the courts will not lower the quality of the other
departments' performance by denuding them of the dignity and burden of their
own responsibility.
BICKEL, supra note 95, at 24.
102. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
103. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
104. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
105. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1977) (plurality opinion)); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at
503 (plurality opinion)).
106. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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protection of abortion rights."7 In apparent recognition that Roe
could not be defended on the basis of historical tradition, Casey
invoked a much broader theory, that of reasoned judgment. 08 Casey
simply ignored Bowers. In Glucksberg, the Court acknowledged
Casey and its reaffirmation of Roe, but it did little to explain the
radically different methodologies in the Court's two competing lines
of substantive due process decisions.109 In reality, as the following
discussion will demonstrate, each of these competing approaches has
substantial grounding in the Supreme Court's precedents, and each
can be defended as a matter of constitutional policy. "0
A. The Theory of Historical Tradition
1. Bowers, Glucksberg, and Their Jurisprudential Antecedents
The approach of Bowers and Glucksberg was foreshadowed by
earlier opinions. Perhaps the most celebrated judicial invocation of
tradition came from the eloquent pen of Justice Harlan, writing in the
1961 case of Poe v. Ullman. " Poe involved a substantive due process
challenge to the same Connecticut statute that the Supreme Court
later would invalidate in Griswold v. Connecticut1 2-a statute
criminalizing the use of contraceptives, even by married couples. The
Court dismissed the challenge in Poe for lack of justiciability,"3 but
Harlan dissented, reaching the merits and finding a violation of due
process.1 4 Harlan's understanding of due process included the notion
of a living tradition, but he also emphasized the importance of history
and the need for objective judicial decisionmaking:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its
content cannot be determined by reference to any code. The
best that can be said is that through the course of this Court's
decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, built
upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has
struck between that liberty and the demands of organized
society. If the supplying of content to this Constitutional
107. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
108. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 849.
109. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 726-28.
110. Here and in the discussion that follows, when I speak of "constitutional policy" I
am referring to the criteria of evaluation that I set out earlier. See supra Part II.
111. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
112. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
113. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 508-09 (plurality opinion); id. at 509 (Brennan, J., concurring
in the judgment).
114. See id. at 522-55 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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concept has of necessity been a rational process, it certainly has
not been one where judges have felt free to roam where
unguided speculation might take them. The balance of which I
speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to
what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed
as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a
living thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs
from it could not long survive, while a decision which builds on
what has survived is likely to be sound. 15
Utilizing this analysis, Harlan concluded that "a statute making it
a criminal offense for married couples to use contraceptives is an
intolerable and unjustifiable invasion of privacy in the conduct of the
most intimate concerns of an individual's personal life." '116 Harlan
accepted the constitutionality of state laws regulating marriage and
banning nonmarital sexual relations, noting that they "form a pattern
so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life that any
Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that basis.""..7
But he noted that "the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an
essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an
institution which the State not only must allow, but which always and
in every age it has fostered and protected."'1 8  Harlan also
emphasized "the utter novelty" of the Connecticut statute:
"Although the Federal Government and many States have at one
time or other had on their books statutes forbidding or regulating the
distribution of contraceptives, none, so far as I can find, has made the
use of contraceptives a crime." '19
Another elaboration and application of a tradition-based
approach came some years later, in the Court's 1977 decision in
Moore v. City of East Cleveland.'E In Moore, the Court invalidated
an East Cleveland housing ordinance that limited the occupancy of a
dwelling unit to members of a single nuclear family, holding that the
ordinance violated the due process rights of a grandmother who
115. Id. at 542. Later I will contend that Harlan's opinion need not be read to support
the theory of historical tradition, as applied in Bowers and Glucksberg. Instead, his
opinion can be read more broadly, in a manner that might support the theory of evolving
national values. See infra Part V.
116. Poe, 367 U.S. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 546.
118. Id. at 553.
119. Id. at 554.
120. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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wished to live with her son and two grandsons, who were cousins. 121
Writing for a plurality of four, Justice Powell quoted Harlan's
description of the Court's function in giving substantive content to the
Due Process Clause, emphasizing the importance of that function but
also noting its risks, "lest the only limits to such judicial intervention
become the predilections of those who happen at the time to be
Members of this Court. ' 122 "Appropriate limits on substantive due
process," Powell stated, "come not from drawing arbitrary lines but
rather from careful 'respect for the teachings of history [and] solid
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.' ",123 Powell
argued that "an approach grounded in history imposes limits on the
judiciary that are more meaningful" than any that might arise from a
more abstract evaluation of "the concept of ordered liberty.
124
Turning to the case at hand, Powell cited the historical stature of
the family in American law and culture, and he concluded that "the
Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the
institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."1" This historical tradition, moreover, is not limited to the
nuclear family. Instead, Powell wrote, "[t]he tradition of uncles,
aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along
with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally
deserving of constitutional recognition."1 26  This tradition, Powell
continued, reflects "the accumulated wisdom of civilization, gained
over the centuries and honored throughout our history. 1 27  As a
result, the challenged housing ordinance was not entitled to judicial
deference; it demanded careful judicial review, and it could not
survive that scrutiny. 1
28
121. See id. at 506 (plurality opinion); id. at 521 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment).
122. See id. at 502 (plurality opinion).
123. Id. at 503 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
124. See id. at 503 n.12 (citing and criticizing the "abstract formula" of Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937), a standard calling for special protection of
rights that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" such that "neither liberty nor
justice would exist if they were sacrificed"). But cf. Moore, 431 U.S. at 548-50 (White, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that the Palko formulation would protect a more restricted set of
liberties than Powell's tradition-based approach).
125. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (plurality opinion).
126. Id. at 504.
127. Id. at 505.
128. See id. at 498-500, 505-06.
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Dissenting from the Court's decision in Moore, Justice White
grudgingly accepted the doctrine of substantive due process even as
he highlighted its tenuous constitutional underpinnings:
Although the Court regularly proceeds on the assumption
that the Due Process Clause has more than a procedural
dimension, we must always bear in mind that the substantive
content of the Clause is suggested neither by its language nor
by preconstitutional history; that content is nothing more than
the accumulated product of judicial interpretation ... 129
Continuing, White noted that the Supreme Court "is the most
vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-
made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the
language or even the design of the Constitution."' 30 Although he did
not suggest that existing precedents should be overruled, White
argued that "the Court should be extremely reluctant to breathe still
further substantive content into the Due Process Clause so as to
strike down legislation adopted by a State or city to promote its
welfare....' Otherwise, he concluded, the Court would "unavoidably
pre-empt[] for itself another part of the governance of the country
without express constitutional authority." '32
Nine years after Moore, Justice White found himself writing for
the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick.'33 Echoing his dissenting opinion in
Moore but speaking now for a majority, White reiterated that
substantive due process has "little or no cognizable roots in the
language or design of the Constitution," '134 and he stated that "[t]here
should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach
of [due process], particularly if it requires redefining the category of
rights deemed to be fundamental." '35 Although White had criticized
the use of historical tradition as a source of rights in Moore,'36 he now
embraced Moore's emphasis on history and suggested that
substantive due process protection-at least in the absence of
preexisting precedent-should be confined to "those liberties that are
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' "137 Justice
129. Id. at 543-44 (White, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 544.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
134. Id. at 194.
135. Id. at 195.
136. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 549-50 (White, J., dissenting).
137. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (plurality opinion)).
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White also recited the more abstract formulation of Palko v.
Connecticut,38 which would protect rights that are " 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice
would exist if [they] were sacrificed.' "139 But this alternative
formulation appeared to be doing no work at all. Instead, White's
analysis for the Court was strictly historical. 40
Applying Moore's historical approach to the substantive due
process claim presented in Bowers, Justice White had little difficulty
rejecting it:
Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and was
forbidden by the laws of the original 13 States when they
ratified the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the 37 States in the Union
had criminal sodomy laws. In fact, until 1961, all 50 States
outlawed sodomy, and today, 24 States and the District of
Columbia continue to provide criminal penalties for sodomy
performed in private and between consenting adults.'
"Against this background," Justice White concluded, any claim of a
historical right to engage in such conduct "is, at best, facetious."'4 2
Applying an exceedingly deferential standard of review and noting
that the law "is constantly based on notions of morality," White
upheld Georgia's criminal sodomy prohibition based on "the
presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that
homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable.' ' 43
The dissenters in Bowers condemned the Court's narrow focus
on historical tradition,1" arguing that the Court instead should play a
far more creative role in defining " 'the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men,' namely, 'the right to be
138. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
139. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92 (quoting Palko, 302 U.S. at 325, 326).
140. See id. at 191-95.
141. Id. at 192-94 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 192 (noting that proscriptions
against sodomy have "ancient roots").
142. Id. at 194; see also id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("To hold that the act of
homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside
millennia of moral teaching."); cf id. at 198 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that recent
decades of prosecutorial nonenforcement and legislative repeal suggest "the moribund
character today of laws criminalizing this type of private, consensual conduct," but
concluding that, "for the reasons stated by the Court, I cannot say that conduct
condemned for hundreds of years has now become a fundamental right").
143. Id. at 196 (majority opinion).
144. See id. at 199-200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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let alone.' "145 Some years later, in Casey,'46 the Bowers dissenters
may have found partial vindication in the Court's reasoned judgment
methodology, as discussed below.147 But later still, in Washington v.
Glucksberg,48 the approach of Moore and Bowers returned to center
stage.
In Glucksberg, the Supreme Court held that there is no
substantive due process right to physician-assisted suicide, not even
for competent adults facing terminal illnesses.'49 Sounding themes
very similar to those invoked in Bowers, the Court noted its
reluctance to expand the scope of substantive due process, and it
emphasized the importance of objective judicial standards. 5° As in
Bowers, the Court also mentioned "the concept of ordered liberty,"
but it now appeared that the only function of this language might be
to further confine the set of historical rights warranting constitutional
protection. "Our established method of substantive-due-process
analysis," the Court declared, gives special protection to "those
fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition' and 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if
they were sacrificed.' "15 In any event, the Court made it clear that
no claim would succeed in the absence of historical support for the
asserted liberty interest, specifically and narrowly defined on the basis
of "careful description":'52 "Our Nation's history, legal traditions,
and practices ... provide the crucial 'guideposts for responsible
145. Id. at 199 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928)).
146. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
147. See infra Part III.B.1.
148. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
149. Id. at 735. The Court was unanimous in rejecting the constitutional claim, but it
was more divided in its reasoning. Even so, five Justices fully joined the majority opinion,
including its discussion of substantive due process methodology. Justice O'Connor was
among these five, although she also wrote a brief concurring opinion. In her separate
opinion, O'Connor questioned the majority's characterization of the precise issue at hand
and left open the possibility of a viable constitutional claim in extreme circumstances, in
particular, if the dying individual was experiencing great pain or suffering that could not
be alleviated by medication. See id. at 736-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
150. See id. at 720 (majority opinion).
151. Id. at 720-21 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325, 326 (1937)).
152. Id. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)); see also id. at 722-23
(narrowly defining the asserted liberty interest in the case at hand); cf Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) ("We refer to
the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to,
the asserted right can be identified.").
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
decisionmaking' that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due
Process Clause. ' 153  Explicitly rejecting a more expansive
methodology advocated by Justice Souter in his separate opinion,154
the Court argued that its tradition-based approach was a "restrained
methodology" that minimized the risk of subjective judicial
decisionmaking.'55
Based upon its detailed historical review'56 of "our Nation's
traditions" as they relate to suicide and assisted suicide, the Court
found "a consistent and almost universal tradition that has long
rejected the asserted right, and continues explicitly to reject it today,
even for terminally ill, mentally competent adults."'57 It noted that
"[f]or over 700 years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition has
punished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting
suicide,"'58 and that, with rare exception, "our laws have consistently
condemned, and continue to prohibit, assisting suicide."'59  As a
matter of contemporary law, the Court observed, "[i]n almost every
State-indeed, in almost every western democracy-it is a crime to
assist a suicide."' 60 To recognize the asserted constitutional right in
this case, the Court concluded, would require it "to reverse centuries
of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy
choice of almost every State."16' Applying rational basis review, the
Court readily upheld Washington's criminal prohibition on assisted
suicide, citing, among other grounds, the State's " 'unqualified
interest in the preservation of human life' "162 as well as the State's
153. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125
(1992)).
154. See id. at 765-73 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). For a discussion of
Souter's opinion and the methodology it employs, see infra Part V.A.
155. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721-22. See generally Robert C. Post, The Supreme
Court, 2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and
Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 91 (2003) (arguing that Glucksberg "proposed a profound
reconceptualization of substantive due process" by restricting the Court to a tradition-
based inquiry and by "impos[ing] a straitjacket" on that inquiry).
156. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710-19.
157. Id. at 723.
158. Id. at 711.
159. Id. at 719.
160. Id. at 710.
161. Id. at 723.
162. Id. at 728 (quoting Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990)).
The Court explained that states " 'may properly decline to make judgments about the
"quality" of life that a particular individual may enjoy,' ... even for those who are near
death." Id. at 729-30 (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282).
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interests in protecting vulnerable patients and in preserving the role
of the physician as healer. 63
The Court distinguished its earlier decision in Cruzan 64 as one
that protected "the traditional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving
medical treatment," 65 a right derived from "the common-law rule
that forced medication was a battery" and "the long legal tradition
protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment."' 66
The Court could not distinguish Roe or Casey on the basis of
tradition, however, and it made no attempt to do so, stating only that
substantive due process protection for personal autonomy in certain
contexts, including abortion, does not mean that "any and all
important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected. 1 67 In
fact, as we will see, the decisionmaking methodology that the Court
employed in Casey (and that it had employed in Roe) might well have
required a different result in Glucksberg)6 But the Court in
Glucksberg appeared to view Casey (and therefore Roe) as
aberrational, asserting that whatever the methodology of Casey, it
should not be understood to "jettison our established approach" to
substantive due process. 169
2. Evaluating the Theory of Historical Tradition
Notwithstanding the Court's bold assertions in Glucksberg, the
theory of historical tradition was not then and is not now the Court's
"established approach" to substantive due process. Instead, it was
then and is now a deeply contested theory, one that the Court has
followed in some but not all of its contemporary decisionmaking.
Even so, this theory has much to commend it as a matter of
constitutional policy.
Recall my three criteria of evaluation: majoritarian self-
government, judicial objectivity and competence, and functional
justification. 7 ° Under the first criterion, the question is how or to
what extent a particular theory can be reconciled with the principle of
majoritarian self-government. By its very nature, substantive due
process permits the Supreme Court, with little or no support from the
163. See id. at 728-35.
164. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
165. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
166. Id. at 725.
167. See id. at 726-27.
168. See infra Part IV.
169. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 n.17.
170. See supra Part II.
[Vol. 85
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
text or original meaning of the Constitution, to invalidate legislation
and thus to repudiate the judgments of elected officials. As a result,
all theories of substantive due process-that is, all theories that
countenance this doctrine in any form-are in serious tension with
the principle of majoritarian self-government. Nevertheless, the
theory of historical tradition permits substantive due process to
operate in relative harmony with this basic and longstanding
democratic precept.
In the words of Justice Harlan's opinion in Poe, this theory calls
for the Court to identify "the balance which our Nation ... has struck
between [the liberty of the individual] and the demands of organized
society," that is, "the balance struck by this country." '171  As
elaborated in Moore and Bowers, and as further refined in
Glucksberg, this approach requires the Court to define the
constitutional claim narrowly and with precision. The Court then
must canvass American social and legal history (and its antecedents),
working from the past to the present, to determine whether the claim
has broad and longstanding historical as well as contemporary
support.'72 Only if the asserted individual right is "deeply rooted" in
American history will the right be eligible for special constitutional
protection, that is, protection from aberrational legal policies that
depart from the national historical pattern. As Justice Harlan argued
in Poe and as Justice Powell concluded in Moore, the requisite
historical support can be found for the protection of marital intimacy
from intrusive regulation 73 and for the right of families, including
extended families, to live together as family units.1 74 But as the Court
held in Bowers and Glucksberg, the same cannot be said of
homosexual intimacy75 or physician-assisted suicide. 76
Under this theory of substantive due process, it is our national
history that delimits and circumscribes the rights that qualify for
special protection. And this national history is itself revealed by
"deeply rooted" societal patterns and legal policies. These societal
patterns and legal policies, especially those that have been embodied
in legislation, can fairly be described as majoritarian. It is more
171. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
172. See McConnell, supra note 87, at 671 (noting that the Court's inquiry properly
extends to the present in order to ensure that historical practices "continuef] to reflect the
mores of the nation").
173. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 539, 553-55 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
174. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-05 (1977) (plurality opinion).
175. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986).
176. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710-19, 723 (1997).
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difficult to make this claim for common law doctrines, but they, too,
have at least been subject to the possibility of legislative control or
correction. In short, the theory of historical tradition is in relative
harmony with the principle of majoritarian self-government because
it protects liberties that, over time, have been recognized, approved,
and maintained by the American people and by their elected
representatives. 177
This theory also fares well under my second criterion, that of
judicial objectivity and competence. Before embracing this approach
in Bowers, Justice White had argued earlier, in Moore, that it does
not provide an adequate standard for judicial decisionmaking. "What
the deeply rooted traditions of the country are is arguable," he wrote,
and "which of them deserve the protection of the Due Process Clause
is even more debatable.' ' 78  Especially as refined in Glucksberg,
however, the approach of historical tradition provides an objective
standard of decisionmaking, and it is a standard that judges are
competent to employ on a consistent and principled basis. This
standard substantially restricts the Court's discretion, precluding it
from recognizing an unenumerated constitutional right-no matter
how attractive the Justices otherwise might find it-unless the right
can be derived, objectively, from an examination of the Nation's
history and traditions.
To be sure, this approach does not create a litmus test, but it
does provide clear guidelines. According to Glucksberg, the Court is
to test the asserted claim of constitutional protection, narrowly and
specifically defined, against the Nation's traditional treatment of the
claim-as revealed by historical practices, including especially our
legal traditions. The Court's focus on the particular claim at hand,
narrowly defined, is a critical element of this theory. As Professors
Laurence H. Tribe and Michael C. Dorf have noted, "historical
traditions, like rights themselves, exist at various levels of
generality."' 79 Tribe and Dorf contend that determining the proper
level of generality is a value-laden choice and is prone to judicial
177. Cf. McConnell, supra note 87, at 682 (noting that, like formally adopted
constitutional text, "[l]ongstanding consensus similarly reflects a supermajority of the
people, expressed through decentralized institutions"); Michael W. McConnell, Textualism
and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1136 (1998) ("[T]he
interpreter looks at what decentralized and representative bodies have done, over time,
and treats their consensus as authoritative.").
178. Moore, 431 U.S. at 549 (White, J., dissenting).
179. Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of
Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1088 (1990).
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manipulation.1 8 But under the theory of historical tradition, as
articulated in Glucksberg, the potential for value-laden judicial
manipulation is substantially reduced.
In deciding any case, whether constitutional or otherwise, the
Supreme Court (like any court) must describe the scope of the legal
issue or legal claim at hand. In the context of substantive due
process, according to Glucksberg, the Court is to describe the claim
narrowly rather than broadly. In particular, the claim should be
defined narrowly enough to reflect its salient political-moral
components. For example, an asserted right to same-sex marriage has
salient political-moral dimensions that are not included in a more
general or abstract definition of the asserted right, one that would
omit the same-sex dimension and simply assert a right to marriage.
Deciding what is salient for any particular claim is a matter of
discernment, but the Court is not exercising its own political-moral
judgment at this stage. Rather, it is discerning the precise nature of
the political-moral issue at hand so that it can determine whether an
asserted claim of liberty has the affirmative support of a historical
tradition, thereby providing the claim with a majoritarian sanction.
Defining the claim more broadly, in a manner that omitted salient
political-moral features, would make it impossible to conclude that
the claim has the requisite, tradition-based support.
Having thus defined the claim at hand, the Court evaluates its
validity primarily on the basis of a historical inquiry-historical, but
not originalist. As Professor (now Judge) Michael W. McConnell has
explained, "it is not necessary to show that a challenged practice was
protected at the time of adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, but
only that it has enjoyed protection over the course of years." ' In
conducting its historical inquiry, the Court examines conventional
legal sources, including the common law and patterns of legislation.
There might be close questions concerning whether these sources
180. See id. at 1085-93.
181. McConnell, supra note 87, at 671 (footnote omitted). See generally Michael W.
McConnell, Tradition and Constitutionalism Before the Constitution, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV.
173, 174 ("Like originalism, the ['traditionalist'] approach is historical; but instead of
viewing authoritative history as a snapshot of a particular moment, it views as
authoritative the gradually evolving moral principles of the nation."). For a contrary view,
see Steven G. Calabresi, Lawrence, The Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court's
Reliance on Foreign Constitutional Law: An Originalist Reappraisal, 65 OHIO ST. L.J.
1097, 1110 (2004) (contending that constitutional recognition is warranted only for
tradition-based rights that have enjoyed protection "since 1776 or at least since the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868" (footnote omitted)). See also id. at 1115
(extending this conclusion to the identification of unenumerated rights under either the
Due Process Clause or the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
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demonstrate a tradition that is sufficiently longstanding and broad
based to qualify as "deeply rooted" and therefore to justify the
recognition of a tradition-based right. And even if a tradition is
"deeply rooted," there is the further, nonhistorical and normative
question that Justice White suggested in Moore: is this a tradition
that warrants contemporary constitutional protection? In answering
this normative question, the Court must decide for itself whether the
claim of liberty, however traditional, is valuable and worthy of
constitutional recognition. After all, the tradition in question might
be outdated and in need of revision. But close questions are
unavoidable at the margins of any legal standard, and substantive due
process, in the end, will inevitably require a normative judgment from
the Court.182 What is critical for present purposes is the requirement
that, at a minimum, the right must be "deeply rooted." This is an
objective inquiry, based on conventional legal sources, "given from
without," '183 that "direct and restrain [the Court's] exposition of the
Due Process Clause."'' " The Justices are not left "free to roam where
unguided speculation might take them. 185
My third criterion, that of functional justification, asks whether a
theory of substantive due process includes a contemporary, functional
justification for the judicial decisionmaking that it authorizes. In
other words, does the Supreme Court's protection of unenumerated
constitutional rights, in accordance with the prescribed decisional
methodology, advance or improve contemporary governance and
policymaking in the United States? Under the theory of historical
tradition, substantive due process arguably serves at least three
functions.
First, substantive due process-regardless of the theory
employed-serves a nationalizing function. When the Court
recognizes substantive due process rights, they are national rights that
every state and locality must honor. Federalism is an important
constitutional value, of course, but the United States is a single
nation, and the fundamental rights of our citizens are properly
182. But cf McConnell, supra note 87, at 672 (contending that the tradition-based
approach, as expounded in Glucksberg, eliminates the need for any independent
normative judgment by the Court); Post, supra note 155, at 92-95 (same).
183. CARDOZO, supra note 98, at 174.
184. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
185. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In light of this
discussion, it should be clear that I strongly disagree with Professor Neal Devins's
contention that "[t]he methodology employed in Glucksberg is indeterminate to the point
of being irrelevant." Neal Devins, Substantive Due Process, Public Opinion, and the
"Right" to Die, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 327, 332 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006).
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defined and protected as a matter of national constitutional law.18 6
This function is not adequate, in itself, to support any particular
theory of substantive due process, because no theory can withstand
scrutiny unless it can justify the substantive content of the rights that
it protects. But the protection of national constitutional rights,
however defined, helps ensure that we identify ourselves as
"Americans first and Georgians or New Yorkers second." '87  Like
other theories of substantive due process, the theory of historical
tradition serves this function by identifying national rights that help
define Americans as members of a national political community. 188
Second, the national rights that this particular theory would
protect are rights that reflect conventional and longstanding legal
principles. Thus, under this theory, substantive due process serves a
conserving function, furthering stability in the law and protecting
societal expectations concerning individual freedom. It protects
traditional forms of liberty, as long as they continue to find broad
support in the national society. In so doing, substantive due process
guards " 'the basic values that underlie our society,' "189 ensuring
historical continuity and precluding precipitous departures from time-
honored traditions. 19
Third, the theory of historical tradition would protect these basic
values not only to provide continuity and to protect settled
expectations, but also because traditional American values should be
regarded as presumptively sound-if not as a matter of general truth,
186. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Nonoriginalist Constitutional Rights and the Problem of
Judicial Finality, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 9, 26-30 (1985). But cf. Lund & McGinnis,
supra note 88, at 1599-1603 (arguing that competitive federalism is the best way to
generate new norms of liberty in the United States).
187. "Some minimum homogeneity of social institutions is necessary if people are to
consider themselves Americans first and Georgians or New Yorkers second." RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 193 (1985); cf. The Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 112 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting) ("The question is
now settled by the fourteenth amendment itself, that citizenship of the United States is the
primary citizenship in this country; and that State citizenship is secondary and derivative,
depending upon citizenship of the United States and the citizen's place of residence.").
188. Cf McConnell, supra note 87, at 690 ("A jurisprudence based on tradition ...
leaves room for experimentation and variation among the states," but when "a stable
national consensus has emerged and persisted ... it may be advisable to force remaining
outlier states to conform to the national norm.").
189. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
190. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 n.2 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(claiming that the purpose of the Due Process Clause "is to prevent future generations
from lightly casting aside important traditional values-not to enable this Court to invent
new ones").
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then at least for the United States. In other words, as Professor
McConnell has argued, substantive due process should be understood
to serve a Burkean function.9 According to this theory, as Justice
Powell wrote in Moore, our longstanding values represent "the
accumulated wisdom of civilization."'" These values are "deeply
rooted"-they are "treasured by both past and present" 93-for good
reason: they are probably the right values for American society to
honor and maintain. This third function, like the first two, supports
substantive due process as a vehicle for protecting traditional liberties
from aberrational policies, such as Connecticut's intrusion on marital
intimacy 94 or East Cleveland's on the right of families to live together
as they choose.1 95
These three functions, taken together, provide a plausible and
credible functional justification for the theory of historical tradition.
But this claim of functional utility can be challenged on either of two
grounds. First, one might argue that substantive due process in
accordance with this model could be harmful, not useful, to
191. A British statesman and political philosopher of the eighteenth century, Edmund
Burke maintained that traditional practices reflect an inherited wisdom that should not
lightly be discarded. In his classic Reflections on the Revolution in France, for instance,
Burke wrote that "[t]he science of government ... requires experience, and even more
experience than any person can gain in his whole life, however sagacious and observing he
may be." EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 53 (J.G.A.
Pocock ed., 1987) (1790). When closely examined, he continued, the enduring "general
prejudices" of society typically reflect a "latent wisdom." Id. at 76. As a result,
longstanding societal habits and opinions should not be "cast[] away," but instead should
be "cherish[ed]," and all the more so "the longer they have lasted and the more generally
they have prevailed." Id. Professor McConnell embraces Burke's insights and advances
complementary arguments in defending the substantive due process theory of historical
tradition. See McConnell, supra note 87, at 682-85 & n.96; see also McConnell, supra note
177, at 1133-34 (extending the argument for Burkean traditionalism to constitutional
interpretation more generally).
For an argument that Burke's political theory can be understood to support a
more creative, common law method of constitutional interpretation, see Ernest Young,
Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation,
72 N.C. L. REV. 619 (1994). (As I explain below, this type of common law methodology,
as applied to substantive due process, can be seen as a refinement of the approach of
reasoned judgment. See infra Part V.A.) For a nuanced account of "Burkean
minimalism" in constitutional law, including an assessment of its strengths and limitations,
see Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006).
192. Moore, 431 U.S. at 505 (plurality opinion).
193. "[T]he search ... is for values deeply embedded in the society, values treasured by
both past and present, values behind which the society and its legal system have
unmistakably thrown their weight." Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 1040 (1979) (emphasis omitted).
194. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86; Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553-55 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
195. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 503-06 (plurality opinion).
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contemporary legal policymaking. Second, one might contend that
even if the doctrine of substantive due process under this theory is not
harmful, its functional utility is minimal at best, because the doctrine
is so narrowly confined that it hardly affects contemporary
governance at all.
According to the first critique, the constitutional enshrinement of
traditional values can operate as a deadening force, giving
constitutional weight to past political thought that ought to be
rejected and cast aside. But according to this theory of substantive
due process, a traditional liberty warrants constitutional protection
only if it continues to have broad support in the contemporary society
and legal culture. In addition, the Supreme Court is required to
determine for itself, as a matter of normative judgment, that the
liberty is valuable and worthy of constitutional recognition. The
Court's normative judgment might be mistaken, of course, and its
protection of conventional liberties through the invalidation of
aberrational policies could have the effect of preventing desirable
experimentation. Witness, for example, the Court's protection of
traditional economic liberty during the Lochner era. 96 Under a
proper understanding of the theory of historical tradition, however,
the Court was wildly in error during the Lochner period, not only in
its normative judgment, but also in its persistent protection of a
traditional value that clearly and increasingly lacked the requisite
contemporary support. Properly understood and properly employed,
the theory of historical tradition is unlikely to prevent progressive
changes in the law, that is, legal changes emerging from the ordinary
political process. More generally, it is unlikely to result in the
improper or excessive invalidation of contemporary legal policies.
The second critique is more telling. According to this critique,
the theory of historical tradition calls for too little invalidation of
contemporary policymaking. Its requirements of longstanding
historical support in addition to broad contemporary support are so
demanding that the Supreme Court is hardly ever justified in
protecting an unenumerated right in the face of a conflicting law. The
statutes at issue in Poe and Moore were properly subject to
invalidation, but those statutes were exceptional departures from
historical and contemporary American values. Far more often, this
theory requires the approval of contemporary legal policies, including
policies that ought to be repudiated. In his dissenting opinion in
Bowers, for instance, Justice Blackmun lambasted the majority's
196. See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
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reliance on the historical and continuing presence of sodomy
prohibitions as reason enough to reject the claim of constitutional
protection. In so doing, he invoked the words of Justice Holmes:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule -simply persists from blind
imitation of the past.'97
According to Blackmun, the Supreme Court should not approve laws,
even commonplace laws, merely because they are old or merely
because they have continuing contemporary support. But under the
theory of historical tradition, such laws are immune from invalidation.
Must substantive due process be so feeble, or might it serve a more
powerful and important contemporary function?
B. The Theory of Reasoned Judgment
1. Casey and Its Jurisprudential Antecedents
In the view of Justice Blackmun and others, substantive due
process can and should play a much more vibrant role, one that does
not confine the Supreme Court to historical tradition, nor even to
prevailing contemporary values. Instead, under this competing
approach, the Supreme Court is free to identify rights independently,
through a process that amounts to philosophical analysis or political-
moral reasoning. In the words of Professor Ronald Dworkin, the
Justices should consult their "own views about political morality" as
they seek "to find the best conception of constitutional moral
principles ... that fits the broad story of America's historical
record." 19 More precisely, the Supreme Court should itself evaluate
197. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897),
quoted in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
198. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 3-4, 11 (1996). In an argument not limited to substantive due
process, Professor Dworkin contends that judges should give the Constitution a "moral
reading" that "brings political morality into the heart of constitutional law." Id. at 2; see
McConnell, supra note 87, at 668 (noting that this approach "makes judging an application
of moral philosophy"). See generally RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES (2006)
(elaborating and defending the view that political morality should play a central role in
judicial decisionmaking).
In a similar vein, Professor Michael J. Perry once argued that constitutional
interpretation calls for judges "to engage in the pursuit of political-moral knowledge" as
they seek to advance "the fundamental aspirations signified by the Constitution," adding
that judges (without ignoring history or precedent) "should rely on [their] own beliefs as to
[Vol. 85
2006] SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
the liberty interest of the individual and weigh it against competing
governmental concerns, determining on this basis whether the liberty
interest deserves protection as a constitutional right.1 Using the
language of the Court's 1992 decision in Casey, I am calling this the
theory of "reasoned judgment. '' 21 But this approach-under one
label or another-is evident in earlier cases as well.
In Bowers, for instance, four Justices clearly embraced this type
of methodology, albeit in dissent. Speaking for these four Justices,
Justice Blackmun declared that the doctrine of substantive due
process should be understood to protect " 'the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men,' namely, 'the right
to be let alone.' "201 In defining the scope of this potentially limitless
right and in determining its reach in the case at hand, Blackmun
relied neither on history nor on contemporary national values.
Instead, he offered a direct-and frankly philosophical-analysis of
the interests at stake. Citing the " 'moral fact that a person belongs to
himself and not others nor to society as a whole,' "I'e Blackmun
argued that substantive due process properly protects personal
decisions that are important to an individual's life and especially to
"an individual's self-definition," because it is "the 'ability
what the aspiration[s] require[]." MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW:
A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY 147, 149 (1988). Notably, Perry no longer subscribes to this
position. Much to the contrary, he now advocates (a version of) originalist constitutional
interpretation, and, embracing the insights of James Bradley Thayer, he contends that
American-style judicial review should include judicial deference to the reasonable
judgments of elected officials on contested constitutional questions. See MICHAEL J.
PERRY, TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: RELIGION, LAW, COURTS 87-140
(2007). For Thayer's classic argument, see James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope
of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
199. In fact, balancing may occur at each of two levels of analysis. First, the Supreme
Court balances competing interests at a relatively general or abstract level in order to
determine whether the Court should recognize a presumptively protected constitutional
right and, if so, how it should define the content of that right, including the degree of
presumptive protection it should be accorded. Second, depending on the nature of the
presumptive protection the Court has afforded, further balancing may be needed to
determine whether the right has been violated in the case at hand. Cf MELVILLE B.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT §§ 2.02 to 2.03. (1984) (explaining a somewhat similar distinction,
between "definitional" and "ad hoc" balancing, in the context of the First Amendment).
My focus here is primarily on the first type of balancing, that is, the general comparison of
competing interests that informs the Supreme Court's recognition and definition of an
unenumerated constitutional right.
200. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992).
201. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
202. Id. at 204 (quoting Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 777 n.5 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
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independently to define one's identity that is central to any concept of
liberty.' "I03 These self-defining decisions, he added, include decisions
about personal relationships, because "we all depend on the
'emotional enrichment from close ties with others.' ,204
Turning more specifically to the issue presented in Bowers,
Blackmun asserted that individuals "define themselves in a significant
way through their intimate sexual relationships with others" and that
"there may be many 'right' ways of conducting those relationships. '"20 5
As a result, Blackmun argued, individuals have a strong interest in
determining the nature of these "intensely personal" relationships for
themselves.2 6 Blackmun was equally forthright in his evaluation of
the State's primary interest in this context, an interest in promoting
traditional sexual morality. For Blackmun, this interest warranted
neither respect nor accommodation, because it represented nothing
more than illicit prejudice and religious intolerance, an improper
attempt to "enforce private morality. 2 °7  Toward the end of his
opinion, Blackmun made a passing reference to values "deeply rooted
in our Nation's history,,2 8 but he claimed neither historical nor
contemporary societal support for his specific constitutional
conclusions. Instead, for Blackmun and his fellow dissenters, it was
their own evaluation of the particular interests at stake that led them
to find a constitutional violation.
Justice Blackmun did not speak for a majority in Bowers, but, as
he explained, the Supreme Court had endorsed a similar approach in
earlier cases, notably including the Court's 1973 decision in Roe v.
Wade.2°9 Authored by Blackmun himself, the Court's opinion in Roe
included an extensive historical discussion, recounting and explaining
abortion regulation from ancient times to the present. 210  But this
discussion served as little more than background for the Court's
decision. The Court could not, and did not, defend its protection of
the right to abortion on the basis of America's historical or
contemporary treatment of this issue. The Court suggested that the
law governing abortion at common law, and therefore in the very
early history of the United States, had been relatively lenient,211 but it
203. Id. at 205 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984)).
204. Id. (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 212; see id. at 211-13.
208. Id. at 214.
209. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Bowers, 478 U.S. at 203-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
210. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 129-52.
211. See id. at 132-36, 138-39.
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conceded that a majority of the states, by legislation, had imposed
significant restrictions on abortion for at least the last century.2  The
Court noted a liberalizing trend in more recent legislation, but
liberalization had occurred in only a minority of states, and, in almost
all of them, the changes permitted abortions only in specified and
limited circumstances. 13 Only four states had adopted legislation
even approaching the liberality of the position that the Court would
adopt in Roe as a constitutional rule. 14 Quite clearly, the Court's
decision in Roe was supported neither by historical tradition nor by
prevailing contemporary values.
In reality, the Supreme Court's decision in Roe was based upon
the Court's own evaluation of the relevant political-moral
considerations. Extending substantive due process well beyond the
Court's existing privacy precedents, the Court announced that the
"right of privacy ... is broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 22 As support
for this declaration, the Court engaged in a candid appraisal of the
interests at stake.
Speaking to the interests of a pregnant woman seeking an
abortion, the Court noted that the woman's health, both
psychological and physical, might be directly and immediately
impaired by the continuation of her pregnancy. In any event, the
Court continued, "[miental and physical health may be taxed by child
care. ' '2 6 If the woman is unmarried, she might face "the additional
difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood." ' More
generally, "[m]aternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the
woman a distressful life and future." '  And "[there is also the
distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and
212. See id. at 138-39; see also id. at 174-75 & n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting
that the legislatures of at least thirty-six states and territories had abortion restrictions in
place by 1868).
213. See id. at 139-40 (majority opinion). Most of the legislative revisions were
patterned on section 230.3 of the Model Penal Code, which permitted an abortion only
if-as certified in writing by two physicians-the pregnancy carried a substantial and grave
risk to the physical or mental health of either the mother or the developing child, or if the
pregnancy had resulted from rape, incest, or other felonious intercourse. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 230.3(2)-(3) (1962).
214. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 140 n.37.
215. Id. at 153.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable,
psychologically and otherwise, to care for it." '219
On the other side of its political-moral scales, the Court
recognized that "a State may properly assert important interests in
safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in
protecting potential life."22  But in the Court's estimation, these
interests were inadequate to justify the prevailing approach to
abortion regulation. In particular, these interests could not justify
prohibitions on abortion, or even most types of lesser regulation,
prior to the point of fetal viability.221 The Court asserted that it was
"not resolv[ing] the difficult question of when life begins," noting that
this question had divided, among others, "those trained in the
respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology. 222
Despite its disclaimer, however, the Court clearly did adopt a
particular view about the beginning of human life, because it ruled
that a state generally can intervene to protect human life after the
point of fetal viability, but not before. "This is so," the Court wrote,
"because the fetus [after viability] presumably has the capability of
meaningful life outside the mother's womb., 223 If the Court did not
literally rule that life begins at viability, it at least determined that
viability marks a critical point in human development. After but not
before viability, the Court ruled, a human fetus has sufficient
political-moral status to warrant legal protection against the
competing interests of a woman seeking an abortion.
Needless to say, the Court's political-moral judgment in Roe,
independently determined by the Justices themselves, was and
remains deeply contested and exceedingly controversial. As Justice
White observed in dissent, the Court's decision nullified most existing
abortion statutes and had the effect of precluding the states from
weighing for themselves "the relative importance of the continued
existence and development of the fetus, on the one hand, against a
219. Id.
220. Id. at 154.
221. See id. at 162-66; see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (invalidating various
regulations, including requirements that abortions be performed in accredited hospitals
and that they be approved by special hospital committees and independent physicians).
222. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
223. Id. at 163. Earlier in its opinion, the Court had described viability as the point at
which a fetus becomes "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with
artificial aid." Id. at 160. In an important additional ruling, the Court declared that even
after viability, abortion must be permitted "when it is necessary to preserve the life or
health of the mother." Id. at 163-64.
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spectrum of possible impacts on the mother, on the other hand." '24
Instead, it was the Court's own "marshaling of values" that prevailed,
and Justice White could "find no constitutional warrant for imposing
such an order of priorities on the people and legislatures of the
States." 2 5
In the years following Roe, the Court faced repeated attacks on
its decision. During the Reagan administration, for instance, the
solicitor general argued in an amicus brief that "the textual, doctrinal
and historical basis for Roe v. Wade is so far flawed and ... is a source
of such instability in the law that this Court should reconsider that
decision and on reconsideration abandon it."'22 6 Although the Court
rejected this request in 1986 in Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists,27 its reaffirmation of Roe, which was
originally joined by seven Justices, 228 could garner only a bare
majority of five.22 9  And three years later, the Court's decision in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services230 suggested that Roe might
soon be discarded.23' But in 1992, just when it seemed that Roe might
finally be overturned, the Court issued its surprising decision in
Casey.2
32
In Casey, a five-four majority reaffirmed the "central holding" of
Roe.233 Speaking through an unusual joint opinion by Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter,234 the Court constructed an
elaborate theory of stare decisis in support of its ruling.235 But the
Court did not rely on stare decisis alone, nor did it reaffirm Roe and
its progeny in their entirety. As it had in Roe, the Court strongly
224. Id. at 222 (White, J., dissenting).
225. Id. For intriguing variations on the majority and dissenting views expressed in
Roe, see WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005).
226. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants at 2, filed
jointly in Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)
(No. 84-495), and Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986) (No. 84-1379). During the
Reagan administration and that of the first President Bush, the United States repeatedly
urged the Court to overrule Roe. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833,844 (1992).
227. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
228. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
229. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 747.
230. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
231. See supra note 59.
232. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
233. See id. at 853.
234. The joint opinion was a majority opinion in certain parts and a plurality opinion in
others, but it stated a controlling "middle ground" even when it took the form of a
plurality opinion. See supra note 68.
235. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-69.
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protected the right to abortion prior to viability. But it otherwise
reconfigured the constitutional law of abortion in important ways-
replacing Roe's strict scrutiny with the undue burden test;236
overruling selected post-Roe decisions;237 and declaring that, in the
absence of an undue burden, the right to choose abortion no longer
would bar the states from encouraging women to choose childbirth
instead. 3 ' Beyond stare decisis, the Court invoked a methodology of
"reasoned judgment," explicitly in its evaluation of the liberty interest
of a woman seeking an abortion 39 and implicitly in its newly
calibrated reconciliation of this interest with the State's competing
interest in protecting fetal life. Quite plainly, the Court's "reasoned
judgment" in Casey, no less than in Roe, was drawn neither from
American tradition nor from an objective determination of
contemporary national values. Instead, it was a product of the
Court's own political-moral calculations, albeit in an opinion that was
likewise informed by the values of stare decisis.
Offering what it called an "explication of individual liberty,"'24
the Court announced a presumptive right of personal autonomy and
self-definition. "At the heart of liberty," the Court wrote, "is the
right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery. of human life."24 ' In the context of
abortion, moreover, "the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense
unique to the human condition," because a woman who carries a child
to term "is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that
only she must bear." '242 Moreover, it might be "difficult ... to provide
for the child and ensure its well-being." '243 Although some women
might welcome their pregnancy nonetheless, for others, "the inability
to provide for the nurture and care of the infant is a cruelty to the
child and an anguish to the parent."2" More broadly, the Court
concluded, "[t]he destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large
236. See id. at 869-79 (plurality opinion).
237. See id. at 881-87 (overruling various holdings in City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), and in Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians
& Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)).
238. See id. at 869-79, 881-87, 899-900.
239. Id. at 849 (majority opinion).
240. Id. at 853.
241. Id. at 851.
242. Id. at 852.
243. Id. at 853.
244. Id.
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extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her
place in society." '245
Even so, according to the joint opinion, liberty in this context is
qualified, not absolute:
The woman's liberty is not so unlimited.., that from the outset
the State cannot show its concern for the life of the unborn, and
at a later point in fetal development the State's interest in life
has sufficient force so that the right of the woman to terminate
the pregnancy can be restricted.246
The Court's refined appraisal of the State's interest in fetal life
supported its adoption of the undue burden test and its approval of
abortion regulations that encourage childbirth without imposing such
a burden.2 47  But the Court's revised calculations did not displace
Roe's controversial claim about the political-moral status of a human
fetus, because the Court continued to hold that "[b]efore viability, the
State's interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of
abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman's
effective right to elect the procedure."248
Citing "the urgent claims of the woman to retain the ultimate
control over her destiny and her body" and noting that "it falls to us
to give some real substance to the woman's liberty, 249 the Court in
Casey concluded that "the line should be drawn at viability. 2 ° The
Court relied in part on stare decisis, adding that "Roe was a reasoned
statement, elaborated with great care. 251 It also advanced a "second
reason" for its conclusion:
[T]he concept of viability, as we noted in Roe, is the time at
which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and
nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the independent
existence of the second life can in reason and all fairness be the
object of state protection that now overrides the rights of the
woman.
252
The Court suggested that this approach was fair to women "as a
practical matter," because "[i]n some broad sense it might be said that
245. Id. at 852.
246. Id. at 869 (plurality opinion).
247. See id. at 869-79, 881-87, 899-900.
248. Id. at 846 (majority opinion).
249. Id. at 869 (plurality opinion).
250. Id. at 870.
251. Id.
252. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973)).
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a woman who fails to act before viability has consented to the State's
intervention on behalf of the developing child. ' 253 More generally,
the Court stated that no other line would be "more workable., 254 On
the basis of its own understandings of "reason" and "fairness," then,
the Court in Casey concluded, as it had in Roe, that there is no
political-moral warrant for protecting a nonviable fetus by means that
frustrate a woman's right to choose abortion.
Vehemently rejecting the Court's decision, the four dissenters in
Casey were prepared to overrule Roe outright and to adopt a highly
deferential approach to abortion regulations.255 They objected not
only to the specific holdings and doctrine that emerged from Casey
but also to the Court's substantive due process methodology. The
dissenters complained that the reasoned judgment approach
improperly addressed constitutional questions at "a level of
philosophical abstraction, in ... isolation from the traditions of
American society," permitting the Court to "decorate a value
judgment and conceal a political choice," one that rested ultimately
on nothing more than the "personal predilection" of the Justices. 6
The Casey dissenters argued that the proper methodology was that of
historical tradition, and under that approach there was no justification
for the Court's decision. 257
2. Evaluating the Theory of Reasoned Judgment
Despite the criticisms of the Casey dissenters, the theory of
reasoned judgment can be defended as a matter of constitutional
policy. The primary strength of this theory relates to my third
criterion of evaluation, that of functional justification. As discussed
earlier, the theory of historical tradition permits substantive due
process to serve a nationalizing function, a conserving function, and a
Burkean function.25 8 But that theory narrowly confines the Court's
substantive due process decisionmaking and severely limits its
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See id. at 944, 966 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 979-81 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
256. Id. at 982, 983, 984 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part); see id. at 1000 (" '[R]easoned judgment' ... turns out to be nothing but
philosophical predilection and moral intuition.").
257. See id. at 952-53 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 980-81 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
258. See supra Part III.A.2.
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contemporary significance. As a result, the case for its functional
utility is relatively weak. The theory of reasoned judgment, by
contrast, calls for a far more robust judicial role, one that permits the
Supreme Court to protect new rights and to invalidate governmental
policies even if those policies have longstanding and continuing
support in American law and society. Under this theory, substantive
due process might have a far more significant-and potentially
salutary-impact on contemporary governance and policymaking in
the United States.
Like the theory of historical tradition, the theory of reasoned
judgment permits substantive due process to perform a nationalizing
function through the recognition and protection of fundamental rights
as a matter of national constitutional law. More important, the
substantive content of these national rights is potentially expansive.
Under the theory of reasoned judgment, the Court does not merely
protect conventional rights in order to provide continuity and to
honor a Burkean sense of traditional wisdom."9 Instead, under the
theory of reasoned judgment, the Court is directly engaged in the
identification of personal liberties that it deems appropriate for our
contemporary society. This theory thus permits substantive due
process to serve a liberty-maximizing function, which dramatically
increases the doctrine's functional significance.
When applying substantive due process in this fashion, the
Supreme Court reads the Constitution to safeguard unenumerated
liberties that warrant protection as a matter of political-moral
philosophy. In conducting its political-moral analysis, the Court does
not ignore American traditions or contemporary societal values, but it
considers them only at a relatively general level of abstraction, so the
Court is not confined to the protection of rights that have specific
historical or contemporary support. Indeed, one of the Court's tasks
is to identify and secure the rights of politically disempowered
minorities, whose legitimate claims may have gone unanswered in the
ordinary political process.260 More broadly, the Court takes it upon
itself, as a matter of reasoned judgment, to evaluate and reconcile
competing interests and values, attempting to reach sound judgments
concerning particular constitutional claims even as it creates an
overall pattern of contemporary constitutional rights that is logical
259. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
260. To this extent, Ely-esque political process considerations may be relevant and
helpful. See generally ELY, supra note 26 (arguing that the Supreme Court should police
the process of representative government, correcting participational defects that work to
the disadvantage of minorities).
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and coherent. Under this approach, liberty is not without limit, but
the Court "maximizes" liberty in the sense that it protects liberty to a
greater degree than other theories of substantive due process would
permit.
Under this theory of constitutional decisionmaking, the Supreme
Court's consideration of substantive due process claims begins with
something like a presumptive "right to be let alone," as invoked by
Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Bowers.26" ' This notion of a
"right to be let alone" is decidedly ambiguous, but it is generally
consistent with the libertarian philosophy of John Stuart Mill, who
argued famously that personal liberty should be honored in the
absence of "harm to others.""26 In opinions advancing this approach,
the Court and individual Justices have refined the libertarian
philosophy that they find implicit in the doctrine of substantive due
process, making it clear that the liberty that they value sounds largely
in individual autonomy and self-definition. This libertarian
philosophy therefore is selective, not all encompassing. It protects
personal decisions that fundamentally affect a person's self-
understanding, basic life direction, and core personal relationships.
Thus, in Bowers, Justice Blackmun spoke of "the 'ability
independently to define one's identity that is central to any concept of
liberty,' "263 and he argued, more specifically, that individuals "define
themselves in a significant way through their intimate sexual
relationships with others."26 Likewise, in Casey, the Court noted not
only the relational consequences of pregnancy and abortion but also
the significance of a woman's abortion decision for her sense of self
and for her destiny in life. According to the Court, "[t]he destiny of
the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception
of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society," 65 because "[a]t
the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life. "266
261. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
262. According to Mill, "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant." JOHN STUART MILL,
ON LIBERTY 10-11 (David Spitz ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1975) (1859) (footnote omitted).
263. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984)).
264. Id.
265. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
266. Id. at 851.
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The approach of reasoned judgment calls for the Court to
consider not only the individual's general interest in self-definition
and autonomy, including autonomy in the formation of personal
relationships, but also other, more particular individual interests, and
competing governmental interests as well. In Casey, for instance, the
Court cited a woman's specific interests and concerns in the context
of pregnancy and abortion. 67 The Court also linked its protection of
the right to abortion to its contraceptive decisions268 and to its
recognition in Cruzan219 of a right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment, a right that protected, to some extent, a personal interest
in bodily integrity.7 0 Although the issue of abortion raised very
different issues, the Court's analysis suggested a plausible coherence
in the overall pattern of the special liberties that it had chosen to
protect.
In considering the governmental side of the balance when these
special liberties are at stake, the Court is inclined to follow a version
of the Millian "harm to others" principle, rejecting governmental
paternalism, at least if the government is attempting merely to
advance an interest in personal morality. In the words of Justice
Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Bowers, the government (despite
traditional understandings to the contrary) 271 has no business
"enforc[ing] private morality. '27 2  In most contexts, however,
267. Id. at 852-53.
268. See id.
269. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
270. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 857.
271. According to traditional understandings of the police power, the government
legitimately may act to promote the morality of its citizens as well as their health and
safety. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (plurality opinion)
("The traditional police power of the States is defined as the authority to provide for the
public health, safety, and morals, and we have upheld such a basis for legislation."); Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545-46 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[S]ociety is not limited in its
objects only to the physical well-being of the community, but has traditionally concerned
itself with the moral soundness of its people as well."). See generally Suzanne B.
Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v.
Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1243-83 (2004) (canvassing the Supreme Court's frequent
endorsements of this traditional view, but arguing that the Court, in reality, has rarely
approved governmental action exclusively and explicitly on the basis of morality).
272. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 212 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see id. at
211-13.
Quite apart from substantive due process, one might argue that the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment imposes limits on morality-based legislation, but this
argument is contested and controversial. Compare Arnold H. Loewy, Morals Legislation
and the Establishment Clause, 55 ALA. L. REV. 159 (2003) (arguing that the Establishment
Clause forbids the government from prohibiting conduct on the basis of "morality
simpliciter," i.e., morality that serves no legitimate secular function), with MICHAEL J.
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including abortion, the state asserts broader and more tangible
interests, requiring the Court to appraise those interests and to weigh
them against the presumptively protected individual liberty. In the
abortion context, for example, the interest of an "other"-indeed, an
interest in preserving an "other's" very life-is or might be at stake,
depending on the status of the unborn fetus. In Casey, the Court
forthrightly evaluated this interest in fetal life and balanced it against
the liberty interest of the pregnant woman, finding, on the basis of
'treason" and "fairness," that "the line should be drawn at
viability." '273 Prior to this point, as Justice Blackmun wrote in his
Casey concurrence, " 'a fetus ... cannot reasonably and objectively be
regarded as a subject of rights or interests distinct from, or paramount
to, those of the pregnant woman.' "274
Although the Casey dissenters suggested otherwise,275 reasoned
judgment cannot be equated with "personal predilection." Reasoned
judgment is not a matter of taste. Rather, it is based on reason and
therefore on reasons, albeit reasons grounded ultimately on
considerations of philosophical, moral, and political theory. The
Court's decisionmaking is informed by an elaborate process of
adjudication, including arguments and counterarguments from the
parties and from amici curiae, as well as arguments among the
Justices themselves. And in the end, the Court must defend its
judgment in a written opinion. As long as the Court is candid-both
in its adoption of a reasoned judgment methodology and in the
reasons for its particular judgment-the Court's judgment, unlike a
matter of taste, is subject to meaningful critique and evaluation. In
Casey itself, for example, the dissenters understood the Court's
reasoned judgment methodology (even though they rejected its
propriety), and they included, as an alternative ground for their
dissent, a critique of the Court's reasoning on its own terms.276
PERRY, UNDER GOD?: RELIGIOUS FAITH AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 20-34 (2003)
(arguing that the Establishment Clause does not forbid outlawing conduct on the basis of a
religiously grounded belief that the conduct is immoral, even if the belief lacks a plausible,
independent secular ground). For a systematic doctrinal and policy analysis, concluding
that laws informed by religious moral premises generally do not, for that reason alone,
violate the Establishment Clause, see Scott C. Idleman, Religious Premises, Legislative
Judgments, and the Establishment Clause, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (2002).
273. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (plurality opinion).
274. Id. at 932-33 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part) (quoting Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 553
(1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
275. See id. at 984 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
276. See id. at 982-84; see also id. at 989 n.5 (criticizing the Court's justification for
treating fetal viability as a critical line of demarcation).
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Applied consistently and cogently, the theory of reasoned
judgment would promote the Supreme Court's development and
enforcement of a coherent set of unenumerated constitutional rights,
rights the Court deems appropriate for the contemporary United
States. Substantive due process would constitutionalize a libertarian
philosophy of individual autonomy and self-definition. It would not
countenance the coercive imposition of personal morality, at least not
on questions of central importance to self-definition. It would
accommodate tangible governmental interests, but only those deemed
worthy of accommodation and of a magnitude sufficient to outweigh
the individual interests at stake.
This is an attractive vision of substantive due process-attractive,
that is, if one embraces a libertarian philosophy along these lines and
accepts the Supreme Court's implementation of this philosophy. 77
But what if the contemporary United States would be better served
by a more communitarian philosophy, or what if, in any event, the
Supreme Court's judgments in particular settings are not sound? If
the Supreme Court's political-moral reasoning is mistaken, of course,
the functional utility of substantive due process is fundamentally
undermined. Mistaken political-moral judgments can hardly advance
or improve contemporary governance and policymaking in the
United States. The risk of error is considerable: the Court could lead
the country in the wrong direction.
The reasoned judgment approach raises difficult questions of
political-moral philosophy, and the functional utility of this approach
hinges on the Court's proper resolution of these questions. If the
Court's answers are generally sound, substantive due process can be
said to serve not only a nationalizing function, but a powerful and
positive liberty-maximizing function as well. But whether the Court's
answers are generally sound is debatable, and that brings us back to
my first and second criteria of evaluation: the criterion of
majoritarian self-government and the criterion of judicial objectivity
and competence.
The criterion of majoritarian self-government creates obvious
and serious problems. As discussed previously, the theory of
historical tradition permits substantive due process to operate in
relative harmony with the principle of majoritarian self-government,
277. Cf Tribe, supra note 9, at 1939-40 (defending a comparable vision of substantive
due process, focused especially on the formation of personal relationships, by linking it to
a capacious reading of the First Amendment as well as "the premise of self-rule implicit in
the entire constitutional edifice").
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because that theory limits unenumerated rights to rights specifically
sanctioned by American history. It draws these rights from
longstanding social and legal traditions, traditions that themselves
reflect a form of majoritarian approval or assent.278 The same cannot
be said for the theory of reasoned judgment. Under this theory, the
Court does not ignore American traditions or contemporary societal
values, but it does not confine itself to rights that have specific
historical or contemporary support. Instead, the Court's
consideration of American traditions and values is part of a broader
and more abstract political-moral inquiry, one that calls for the Court
to itself evaluate and reconcile competing interests and values. As a
result, the Court is free to invalidate legislation, and thus to repudiate
the policymaking of elected officials, based on the Court's own
political-moral judgment, its own determination that the legislation
improperly interferes with individual liberty. To be sure, there are
political checks on the Supreme Court, including the appointment of
new Justices, but these checks have limited efficacy, especially in the
short term. They certainly do not convert the Court into a politically
accountable body that, like a legislature, can properly create law
simply on the basis of political-moral arguments that it finds
persuasive. There is no need to belabor the obvious. Quite clearly,
the methodology of reasoned judgment is exceedingly difficult to
reconcile with the principle of majoritarian self-government. 9
Concerns arising from the principle of majoritarian self-
government also highlight an additional weakness in the theory of
reasoned judgment, a weakness relating to the criterion of functional
justification and, in particular, to the nationalizing function of
substantive due process. The nationalizing function depends on the
premise that the fundamental rights of Americans should not vary
from one state to the next, but instead should be defined at the
national level. As noted earlier, this function, standing alone, cannot
support any particular theory of substantive due process,280 but it may
be that this function is at its weakest under the reasoned judgment
278. See supra Part III.A.2.
279. As currently understood, the reasoned judgment approach tends to favor
libertarian positions associated with the political left. Yet this approach could readily be
transformed into one that favors libertarian positions associated with the right, or perhaps
libertarian positions across the board. See generally BARNETT, supra note 27 (arguing that
the Constitution and its amendments, taken as a whole, support a broadly libertarian
constitutional philosophy, including a general "presumption of liberty" that should be
enforced by the courts). As a result, those of all political persuasions have reason to pause
before conceding to the Court such a robust and uncabined judicial role.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 186-88.
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approach. Under this theory, substantive due process protects rights
that are supported neither by historical tradition nor by
contemporary national values as they relate to the specific issues at
hand. As a result, it protects rights that may be deeply divisive in the
national political community, rights around which the national polity
is unlikely to coalesce. At the same time, the citizens of the various
states, individually, might be far less divided than citizens nationally,
and, within many states, there might be solid majoritarian support
favoring one side of the controversy or the other. In such
circumstances, it is not obvious that rights-even rights on basic and
fundamental matters-should be defined and protected at the
national level. Instead, as the dissenters argued in Casey, a state-by-
state resolution might be preferable, both to honor divergent
majoritarian preferences in the various states and to achieve a
resolution that, in the long run, might prove more stable than a
nationwide ruling from the Supreme Court. 8'
The criterion of judicial objectivity and competence creates
additional difficulties. Under the theory of reasoned judgment, the
Supreme Court does not act as a "naked power organ. ' 282 Reasoned
judgment requires philosophical analysis or political-moral reasoning,
this reasoning is linked in a general way to American history and
contemporary values, and the Court's decisions concerning particular
issues are framed by a broader pattern of substantive due process
rights that the Court must explain as a coherent body of doctrine. To
this extent, the Justices are constrainedand are not left "free to roam
where unguided speculation might take them. '283  But the
methodology of reasoned judgment is far less constraining than that
of historical tradition, because the Court is not limited to rights
derived from an objectively determined, external source of values. In
the words of Justice Cardozo, the Court is doing much more than
"the task of a translator,... reading... signs and symbols given from
without., 284 Rather, it is independently deciding, on the basis of the
reasoning it finds most persuasive, important questions of American
political morality.
Beyond the issue of objectivity is the issue of judicial
competence. On the one hand, the Supreme Court may be better
equipped than other governmental bodies to address and resolve
281. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 995-96 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
282. See Wechsler, supra note 97, at 19.
283. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
284. CARDOZO, supra note 98, at 174.
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these fundamental questions and to resolve them in a consistent and
principled fashion. Unlike legislatures, for example, the Court enjoys
a significant measure of political independence. As a result, it can
fairly address the claims of political minorities despite their lack of
political power. More generally, the Court's independent posture
facilitates the thoughtful and uninhibited pursuit of political-moral
wisdom. Indeed, at its core, the judicial process rests on logic and
reason, and the traditional process of judging bears a family
resemblance to that of philosophical reasoning more generally. But
on the other hand, decisionmaking on this basis necessarily includes
the making of value judgments as to which the Justices can claim no
special expertise or wisdom. As the Casey dissenters complained, the
Justices' value judgments might be no better than those of the
citizenry at large. 85 In any event, the Justices are neither trained as
political philosophers nor selected on that basis. For the Supreme
Court to make decisions simply on the basis of political-moral
reasoning-acting, in effect, as a "bevy of Platonic Guardians" '286-
reflects an extravagant conception of the judicial role, one that takes
the Court well beyond the customary limits of judging.287 In the
words of the Casey dissenters, the methodology of reasoned judgment
belies the conventional understanding that the Justices are
"ascertaining an objective law" and "doing essentially lawyers' work
up here. 288
If the theory of historical tradition unduly cabins the doctrine of
substantive due process, the theory of reasoned judgment goes too far
in the other direction. It permits substantive due process to perform
an important and powerful function-a function that, at its best,
facilitates the recognition of liberties that warrant protection as a
matter of contemporary political morality. But substantive due
process can achieve this objective only if the Supreme Court's
political-moral reasoning is sound. Whether the Court's reasoning is
sound is debatable and, indeed, it is debated even among the Justices
themselves. In any event, the theory of reasoned judgment calls for a
285. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 1001 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
286. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).
287. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Virtues and Verdicts, NEW REPUBLIC, May 22, 2006, at 32,
37 (reviewing RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 198) (arguing that
judicial decisionmaking based on political morality, as advocated by Dworkin, disregards
"the risk of judicial error in the moral domain" and the need for "humility about judges'
own capacity for abstract moral reasoning").
288. Casey, 505 U.S. at 1000 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
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decisionmaking methodology that is radically at odds with the
principle of majoritarian self-government and that severely tests the
limits of judicial objectivity and competence. As we have seen, this
theory is not without justification, and it certainly cannot be dismissed
as a theory of "personal predilection." In the end, however, taking all
of my three criteria into account, it is a theory that is difficult to
accept.
IV. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS AND THE COURT'S COMPETING
THEORIES OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
By the time the Supreme Court came to decide Lawrence v.
Texas,289 its substantive due process doctrine was in serious disarray.
Although Casey29° had firmly embraced the theory of reasoned
judgment, the Court had just as firmly rejected it five years later, in
Washington v. Glucksberg.29' In Glucksberg, the Court, drawing on
earlier precedents, had instead articulated a narrowly drawn theory of
historical tradition, a theory requiring it to reject an asserted right to
physician-assisted suicide.292  Coming on the heels of Casey,
Glucksberg demonstrated not only the theoretical inconsistency of
the Court's two approaches, but also that these two approaches may
support very different results.
If the Court had invoked the approach of reasoned judgment in
Glucksberg, that approach, coupled with the Court's more specific
reasoning in Casey, might well have supported a right to physician-
assisted suicide-at least, as the court of appeals had held, for
competent adults facing terminal illnesses.293  Under Casey's
libertarian philosophy of individual autonomy and self-definition, the
decision of a terminally ill person to choose the manner and timing of
her own death would seem to cry out for constitutional protection.
The person's own body is at stake, as is her conception of personal
dignity and of the meaning of human life itself. As Justice Stevens
wrote in his separate opinion in Glucksberg, the right to make this
decision would permit the person to "choos[e] a final chapter that
289. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
290. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
291. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
292. See supra Part III.A.1.
293. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1996) (en
banc), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). As the Supreme
Court noted, "[t]he Court of Appeals, like the District Court, found Casey '"highly
instructive" ' and '"almost prescriptive" ' for determining '"what liberty interest may
inhere in a terminally ill person's choice to commit suicide."'" Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at
726 (quoting Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 813).
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accords with her life story, rather than one that demeans her values
and poisons memories of her."2 94  Needless to say, procedural
safeguards to ensure that an individual's decision is deliberate and
well informed might properly be required (just as Casey permits for a
woman's abortion decision). But an outright ban on physician-
assisted suicide, as applied to terminally ill persons, is difficult to
defend under the methodology of Casey. Such a ban rests largely on
governmental paternalism and on a contentious moral claim that
human life has continuing value even when an individual, nearing
death's door, regards her life as no longer worth living. Indeed, as a
matter of political-moral reasoning, one might argue that a right to
physician-assisted suicide, if anything, is easier to defend than the
right to abortion. Whereas abortion directly harms what is arguably
an "other" by extinguishing the life or potential life of the unborn
fetus, the suicide of a dying individual directly affects only the person
herself.295
In any event, it would seem that under the approach of reasoned
judgment, the right of terminally ill adults to physician-assisted
suicide would qualify for at least presumptive constitutional
protection.296 In rejecting this result in Glucksberg, of course, the
Court also disavowed the theory of reasoned judgment itself,
complete with its expansive understanding of substantive due process.
Instead, the Court invoked the competing approach of historical
tradition. The Court noted Casey but sidestepped its reasoning,
confronting neither its substantive due process methodology nor its
more specific implications for the question at hand. Instead, the
Court was left to assert, without meaningful explanation, that
substantive due process protection for personal autonomy in certain
contexts, including abortion, does not mean that "any and all
important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected. 297
294. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 747 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
295. The suicide decision, of course, is likely to have important indirect and intangible
effects on others, but the significance of these effects is mitigated by the fact that the
individual is terminally ill and facing imminent death in any event.
296. In his separate opinion in Glucksberg, Justice Souter argued that presumptive
constitutional protection might well be appropriate. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 782
(Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). But he concluded that the claim of right was
defeated in the case at hand by the State's competing interests. In particular, he credited
the State's concern that despite possible procedural safeguards, recognition of the asserted
right might lead to involuntary suicide or to euthanasia. See id. at 782-89. For additional
discussion of Souter's opinion and the theoretical approach that it employs, see infra Part
V.A.
297. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 727 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 33-35 (1973)).
[Vol. 85
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Such was the uneven doctrinal and theoretical landscape that lay
before the Court in Lawrence. The Court's decisions in Casey and
Glucksberg were in obvious and serious tension. The reasoning of
Casey would have supported a different conclusion in Glucksberg,
and Glucksberg's theory of historical tradition plainly would have
required a different result in Casey. With two competing and
radically inconsistent theories in play, the outcome in Lawrence
appeared to hinge on which of these theories the Court would follow.
The approach of historical tradition would call for a reaffirmation of
Bowers v. Hardwick,298 whereas the approach of reasoned judgment,
as articulated in Casey, would strongly support a substantive due
process right to engage in intimate homosexual relationships. In fact,
the Court in Lawrence overruled Bowers and found a constitutionally
protected right,2 99 but it issued a decidedly ambiguous opinion,
nodding in the direction of both historical tradition and reasoned
judgment even as it also suggested the possibility of a third theory,
that of evolving national values.
A. Lawrence, Historical Tradition, and Reasoned Judgment
As we have seen, the theory of historical tradition accords
substantive due process protection only to liberties that are " 'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' "" More specifically, as
the Supreme Court made clear in Glucksberg, this theory permits the
recognition of an unenumerated constitutional right only if the claim
of right, narrowly defined, has broad and longstanding support in
American social and legal history.3"' Applying this approach in
Bowers, the Court refused to accept "a fundamental right [of]
homosexuals to engage in sodomy," a right that would have
"invalidate[d] the laws of the many States that still make such conduct
illegal and have done so for a very long time.""3 2
Under the theory of historical tradition, the Court's holding in
Bowers would seem both unexceptional and unassailable. In
Lawrence, the Court did not repudiate this theory as a general
proposition, and it left intact, without mention, its recent
reaffirmation of this approach in Glucksberg. Yet the Court in
298. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
299. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
300. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at
503 (plurality opinion)).
301. See supra Part III.A.1.
302. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
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Lawrence challenged the historical reasoning of Bowers, implying
that Bowers may have been wrongly decided even on its own terms.
Focusing specifically on homosexual conduct, Bowers had rejected a
right to engage in homosexual sodomy due to its lack of historical
support.303 But as the Court explained and emphasized in Lawrence,
the longstanding historical condemnation of sodomy, both in America
and in Western civilization generally, actually had extended to
heterosexual and homosexual sodomy alike, meaning that there was
"no longstanding history ... of laws directed at homosexual conduct
as a distinct matter."" The Court also noted the infrequency of
actual prosecutions for consensual adult sodomy, "mak[ing] it
difficult to say that society approved of a rigorous and systematic
punishment of the consensual acts committed in private and by
adults."3 5 Apart from legal prohibition, the Court conceded that
homosexual conduct had historically been regarded as immoral, but it
questioned the significance and breadth of this societal
disapprobation, especially with respect to "private homosexual
conduct between consenting adults.""3 6
Even if entirely accurate, however, the Court's historical
clarifications in Lawrence did nothing to undermine the holding of
Bowers under the theory of historical tradition. The fact that
American law and its antecedents banned heterosexual as well as
homosexual sodomy hardly supports a history-based right to engage
in such conduct. And even if society did not condemn homosexual
conduct as broadly or as strongly as Bowers had asserted, society
plainly did not support this conduct as a traditional and time-honored
liberty. Under the theory of historical tradition, Bowers was
undeniably correct. There simply was no traditional liberty that
warranted constitutional protection.
The Court's historical discussion in Lawrence, coupled with its
refusal to address Glucksberg, was unhelpful at best and confusing (or
confused) at worst. The Court left the theory of historical tradition
standing even as it refused to follow its clear implications. This
theory was firmly supported by Glucksberg and Bowers alike, as well
as earlier precedents, but the Court in Lawrence refused to confront
either the theory's jurisprudential pedigree or its strengths and
weaknesses as a matter of constitutional policy. Instead, the Court
303. See id. at 192-94.
304. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568; see id. at 567-71. American laws targeting homosexual
conduct as such, the Court stated, did not appear until the 1970s. See id. at 570.
305. See id. at 569-70.
306. See id. at 571.
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simply sidestepped these questions, feinting toward history with its
largely irrelevant historical commentary.
In addition to its historical discussion, the Court's opinion
included reasoning that appeared to rely on a very different
theoretical approach, that of reasoned judgment. In these portions of
the opinion, the Court spoke more abstractly and philosophically,
suggesting a libertarian approach to substantive due process along the
lines of Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Bowers. °7 At the
outset of its opinion, for instance, the Court declared that "liberty of
the person" includes both spatial and "more transcendent
dimensions" and that it "presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct.' '30 8 Focusing further on the individual interest in the context
at hand, the Court later identified the specific adverse effects of
criminal sodomy statutes, arguing that the statutes not only prohibit
private sexual conduct but also impair and demean the personal
relationships in which such conduct finds expression .309 The sexual
conduct may be "but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring," the Court explained, and "[t]he liberty protected by the
Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this
choice."310 Still later, the Court invoked Casey's vigorous protection
of personal autonomy and self-definition, including " 'the right to
define one's own concept of existence,' " and it extended this
reasoning to the formation of homosexual relationships.3" "The
petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives," the Court
concluded.312 "The State cannot demean their existence or control
their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. "313
As for the governmental side of the political-moral balance, the
Court indicated that, "as a general rule," the State ought not attempt
to control protected personal relationships "absent injury to a person
or abuse of an institution the law protects." '314 Unlike Blackmun's
dissenting opinion in Bowers, the Court did not dismiss the State's
interest in traditional sexual morality as a matter of prejudice and
307. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199-214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see supra text
accompanying notes 201-08.
308. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
309. Id. at 567.
310. Id.
311. See id. at 573-74 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
851 (1992)).
312. Id. at 578.
313. Id.
314. See id. at 567.
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intolerance. Instead, it conceded that this perspective may reflect, for
many individuals, "profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical
and moral principles." '315 But the Court concluded that a majority
cannot "enforce these views on the whole society through operation
of the criminal law." '3 16 This analysis drew upon a version of the
Millian "harm to others" principle.317 In particular, the Court
appeared to reject governmental paternalism in furtherance of
personal morality, at least in the context of criminal laws impairing
special liberty interests, interests that are entitled to presumptive
constitutional protection.318 At the same time, however, the Court
left open the possibility that a state might be permitted to advance a
similar morality interest through its official support of particular
institutions, such as heterosexual marriage, even if those institutions
exclude personal relationships, such as same-sex partnerships, that
fall within the zone of special liberty.319
To the extent that Lawrence rests on reasoned judgment, the
Court's opinion is eloquent and powerful. The Court's Millian
philosophy is eminently reasonable in this context, given the nature of
the individual autonomy that is at stake-autonomy to define one's
own sexual identity and basic life direction, to form a personal human
315. See id. at 571.
316. See id.; see also id. at 577 (" '[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for
upholding a law prohibiting the practice.' " (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting))).
317. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
318. One could read the Court's opinion to adopt a Millian principle for the criminal
law in general, without regard to whether any special liberty is at stake. Cf Barnett, supra
note 9, at 35-37 (reading Lawrence to adopt a general "presumption of liberty" and to
disfavor moral justifications whenever liberty is restricted). The Court did not expressly
adopt a heightened standard of review, and it stated at the end of its opinion that the
challenged law "furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the
personal and private life of the individual." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. The Court's
reference to "legitimate state interest" might suggest a deferential, rational basis standard
of constitutional scrutiny, applicable to any and all intrusions on liberty. But the rest of
this sentence conveys a balancing inquiry, and the Court's full opinion strongly suggests
that the Court was recognizing a special liberty interest and was conducting some type of
heightened review. See Tribe, supra note 9, at 1917 ("[T]he strictness of the Court's
standard in Lawrence, however articulated, could hardly have been more obvious."); cf.
Mark Strasser, Lawrence, Mill, and Same-Sex Relationships: On Values, Valuing, and the
Constitution, 15 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 285, 293 (2006) (contending that the Court in
Lawrence went beyond a straightforward Millian analysis by "attributing positive
constitutional weight to same-sex relationships").
319. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 ("The present case.., does not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons
seek to enter."); see also id, at 575-76 (emphasizing the stigma and collateral consequences
of criminal convictions for sexual conduct).
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relationship of love and affection, and to express and fulfill that
relationship through private acts of sexual intimacy. Moreover, when
considered in light of the Court's other substantive due process
precedents, including its contraceptive and abortion decisions, the
Court's decision in Lawrence can be seen as part of a logical whole, a
body of doctrine that protects personal relationships and activities
relating not only to reproduction but also to sexual expression more
generally.32 Thus, by overruling Bowers, the Court, as a matter of
consistent political-moral reasoning, arguably created a more
coherent overall pattern of contemporary unenumerated rights.
However powerful and well reasoned it might seem, of course,
the Supreme Court's political-moral judgment in Lawrence is not
unassailable. It depends on a contentious libertarian philosophy and
on the Court's rejection, in this context, of the State's conventional
power to promote the personal morality of its citizens.32' More
generally, this type of decisionmaking assumes that the Court
properly can make constitutional judgments on the basis of its own
political-moral calculations, without linking its judgments more
objectively and specifically to historical or contemporary American
social and legal practices.
B. Lawrence and Evolving Values
In fact, the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence did not rest on
philosophical analysis alone. In addition to its unhelpful historical
commentary and its helpful but debatable political-moral reasoning,
the Court discussed and relied upon recent developments in the legal
treatment of consensual sodomy. This analysis suggests the possible
emergence of a different and distinctive theory of substantive due
process, a theory of evolving national values.
The Supreme Court's historical discussion in Lawrence did not
stop with the Court's argument that Bowers had misstated or
overstated the centuries-long legal and social condemnation of
sodomy. Instead, the Court went on to state that "[i]n all events we
think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most
relevance here, 3 2 and it argued that recent developments in the
United States revealed "an emerging awareness that liberty gives
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct
320. See id. at 564-66, 573-74, 577.
321. See id. at 589-90 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (deploring the Court's abandonment of
"the ancient proposition" that a state generally is free to regulate sexual morality and
citing recent lower court decisions that had relied on that principle).
322. Id. at 571-72 (majority opinion).
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their private lives in matters pertaining to sex." '323 More specifically,
the Court referred to the Model Penal Code of 1955, which
recommended the repeal of laws forbidding consensual sodomy.324
The Court noted that roughly half the states had adopted this
approach by 1986, when Bowers was decided, and that additional
states had since followed suit.325  These legislative developments,
coupled with five state court invalidations on the basis of state
constitutional law,326 left only thirteen states with sodomy laws on the
books at the time of Lawrence."' Even in these thirteen states,
moreover, consensual sodomy was rarely prosecuted,328 suggesting
that legal and social disapproval was wavering even in these states.329
Looking beyond our Nation's boundaries, the Court also cited
European legislative and judicial action. It noted the British
Parliament's 1967 repeal of laws punishing homosexual conduct.330 It
also cited and discussed the 1981 decision of the European Court of
Human Rights in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom,"' which invalidated
Northern Ireland's prohibition on consensual homosexual conduct as
a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights.332 The
Court noted that Dudgeon was authoritative in twenty-one European
countries in 1981 and in forty-five by the time of Lawrence.333 The
Court later observed that "[o]ther nations, too, have taken action
consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual
adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct. '3 4
323. See id. at 572.
324. See id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2 (1980)).
325. See id.
326. See id. at 576.
327. See id. at 573.
328. See id.
329. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude,
Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 27-28 (suggesting that Lawrence can be
read to reflect an American-style principle of desuetude, grounded in procedural due
process and calling for the invalidation of laws when they impair constitutionally
important interests "on the basis of moral judgments lacking public support, as
exemplified by exceedingly rare enforcement activity"). But cf Calabresi, supra note 181,
at 1117 (arguing that desuetude does not support a general declaration of constitutional
invalidity, but only a ruling that the law in question is unenforceable unless and until the
state gives appropriate public notice of its intention to start enforcing the law again in the
future).
330. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-73 (citing Sexual Offences Act, 1967, c. 60, § 1
(Eng.)).
331. 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981).
332. Id. 61; see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
333. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
334. Id. at 576.
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To be sure, the Court's opinion in Lawrence did not announce a
new theory of substantive due process, much less a theory explicitly
based on evolving values. Indeed, the Court's opinion left open the
precise significance of the recent developments that it discussed. On
the one hand, the Court linked this discussion to its critique of the
Bowers Court's historical account of sodomy regulation, noting that
these recent developments, including those in Europe, undercut "the
premise in Bowers that the claim put forward was insubstantial in our
Western civilization." '335 On the other hand, the Court also used the
judicial invalidations of sodomy prohibitions, by state courts and by
the European Court of Human Rights, in part as evidence simply that
these other courts had rejected-and thereby undermined-the
reasoning and result in Bowers.33 6 Although these courts were neither
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause nor
identifying unenumerated rights appropriate for national recognition
in the United States, the Supreme Court credited their opinions
nonetheless, presumably as a matter of political-moral reasoning.
Thus, commenting on judicial rulings as well as legislative actions
abroad, the Court declared that "the protected right of homosexual
adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct ... has been
accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other
countries." '337 "There has been no showing," the Court continued,
"that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing
personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent. 3 8
The Court's discussion of recent developments might thus be
linked to either or both of the two prevailing theories of substantive
due process, that of historical tradition and that of reasoned
judgment. But the Court's discussion is also suggestive of another
possibility-that evolving values, as such, might provide a suitable
guideline for substantive due process decisionmaking. This
suggestion is nascent at best in Lawrence, but the Court's decision
planted the seeds for a move in this direction.
V. TOWARD A THEORY OF EVOLVING NATIONAL VALUES
Unlike the theories of historical tradition and reasoned
judgment, there is no developed theory of evolving national values in
335. Id. at 573; see id. at 572-73; see also id. at 576 (suggesting that developments
abroad are relevant "[t]o the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider
civilization").
336. See id. at 576-77.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 577.
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the Supreme Court's substantive due process decisions. There are
only hints and suggestions, most notably those provided by Lawrence.
As a result, this theory will require elaboration and refinement,
drawing out these hints and suggestions with an eye to relevant
constitutional policy and to the strengths and weaknesses of the
Court's two existing theories. The theory of evolving national values,
as articulated here, thus is my own creation far more than the Court's.
But it is a theory that bears a family resemblance to the Court's
existing approaches, that builds upon the Court's suggestive
observations in Lawrence, and that calls for a decisionmaking model
similar to one the Court has employed to resolve other issues of
individual rights. Further, I will argue that as a matter of
constitutional policy, this theory is superior to either of the Court's
existing approaches and therefore ought to be explicitly adopted.
In addition to the Court's opinion in Lawrence, there were
earlier judicial suggestions of an evolving values approach to
substantive due process. As I have argued previously,33 9 Justice
Harlan's invocation of tradition in Poe v. Ullman34 ° can be read to
foreshadow the approach of historical tradition, but Harlan's opinion
also suggested that the doctrine of substantive due process may be
more dynamic. Declaring that due process reflects "the balance
struck by this country," Harlan mentioned not only "the traditions
from which it developed" but also "the traditions from which it
broke," because "tradition is a living thing." '341 Exactly what Harlan
meant is unclear, but this language suggests that substantive due
process should protect not only historical rights but also rights that
have emerged over time, gaining sufficient support in our
contemporary law and culture that the Supreme Court can properly
recognize their existence without engaging in "unguided
speculation." '342 More recently, in his separate opinion in Washington
v. Glucksberg,343 Justice Souter claimed the support of Justice Harlan
in advancing his own "evolving values" approach to substantive due
process.3" Justice Souter's argument is impressive, and it warrants
separate attention and evaluation. As we will see, however, Souter's
approach actually is a refinement of the theory of reasoned judgment.
It should not be confused with the theory of evolving national values
339. See supra Part III.A.1.
340. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
341. Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
342. See id.
343. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
344. See id. at 765-73 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
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that I will be developing and defending in the remainder of this
Article.
A. Justice Souter's "Evolving Values" Refinement of the Theory of
Reasoned Judgment
Expanding upon Justice Harlan's discussion in Poe, Justice
Souter argued in Glucksberg that the Court's task is to define and
apply evolving standards of " 'ordered liberty' comprising a
continuum of rights to be free from 'arbitrary impositions and
purposeless restraints.' "I"4 In so doing, the Court should weigh
competing interests "within the history of our values as a people." '346
Unenumerated constitutional rights, on this view, are derived from
values "exemplified by 'the traditions from which [the Nation]
developed,' or revealed by contrast with 'the traditions from which it
broke.' "I"4 More specifically, the Court's analysis of traditional and
evolving legal standards should address not only the issue at hand but
also related questions. Like common law decisionmaking, this
method looks for "an evolving boundary between the domains of old
principles. 3 48 It "pay[s] respect ... to detail, seeking to understand
old principles afresh by new examples and new counterexamples. '3 49
In Glucksberg, the particular issue before the Court was
physician-assisted suicide, and Souter suggested-contrary to the
majority-that he was prepared (if not quite ready) to recognize
presumptive constitutional protection for terminally ill adults to make
and effectuate this choice.5 0 As support for this conclusion, Souter
noted that although society generally has not decriminalized assisted
suicide, it has eliminated earlier prohibitions and penalties on the
related acts of suicide and attempted suicide."' He also stated that
physician-assisted suicide implicates a liberty interest in bodily
integrity that is similar in some respects to the well-accepted right to
345. See id. at 765 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 549, 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
346. See id. at 764.
347. Id. at 767 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
348. Id. at 770.
349. Id.
350. See id. at 782 (noting that "the importance of the individual interest here, as
within that class of 'certain interests' demanding careful scrutiny of the State's contrary
claim, cannot be gainsaid" and suggesting that this interest "might in some circumstances,
or at some time, be seen as 'fundamental' to the degree entitled to prevail," but observing
further that this "is not ... a conclusion that I need draw here" (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at
543 (Harlan, J., dissenting))). Souter went on to determine that the claim of right was
defeated, for the present, on the basis of the State's competing interests. See id. at 782-89.
351. See id. at 774-77, 781.
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medical care and counsel, even with respect to a life-ending
withdrawal of medical treatment, 352 and he argued that the protection
of abortion rights is analogous as well.353 Under this analysis, the
Court properly could recognize presumptive constitutional protection
for physician-assisted suicide on the basis of evolving American
values, broadly understood-even though only one state, Oregon, has
actually taken specific legal action consistent with this view, and even
though others have consistently and recently reaffirmed their
traditional prohibitions on the practice.354
Souter's understanding of substantive due process is creative and
sophisticated. Despite his protestations to the contrary,355 however,
his approach is hardly one of judicial restraint. Although he links his
approach to evolving American values, Souter would permit the
Court to recognize rights that lack specific historical or contemporary
support. As a result, the recognition of rights under this methodology
ultimately rests on the Court's own philosophical reasoning and
interpolations.356 Souter's methodology therefore amounts to a type
of reasoned judgment, and, indeed, he himself invokes this
terminology in describing his approach. 7
As a refinement of the theory of reasoned judgment, Souter's
particular approach to substantive due process has strengths and
weaknesses that are similar, but not identical, to those identified
previously for this theory.358  Thus, under Souter's approach,
substantive due process serves not only a nationalizing function but
352. See id. at 777-78, 779-80, 781.
353. See id. at 778-79, 781; cf. id. at 790-91 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)
(expressing sympathy for Souter's analysis and for the argument "that one can find a 'right
to die with dignity' by examining the protection the law has provided for related, but not
identical interests relating to personal dignity, medical treatment, and freedom from state-
inflicted pain").
354. See id. at 716-19 (majority opinion).
355. See, e.g., id. at 768 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that
"constitutional review, not judicial lawmaking, is a court's business here," and stating that
a court should not recognize an unenumerated constitutional right unless the challenged
statute's resolution of competing interests is unreasonable).
356. See McConnell, supra note 87, at 698-700 (contrasting Souter's expansive
reasoning with "Harlan's deeply conservative opinion" in Poe and contending that
Souter's opinion was a "misappropriation" of Harlan's approach to substantive due
process).
357. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 769 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (referring to
"the process of substantive review by reasoned judgment"). Not surprisingly, Souter cites
his own (joint) opinion in Casey for the Court's embrace of a reasoned judgment
methodology, adding that the Court's particular judgments should be evaluated
"according to the usual canons of critical discourse." Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992)).
358. See supra Part I11.B.2.
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also a liberty-maximizing function, albeit perhaps not to the same
degree as other, more abstract (and therefore potentially more
expansive) versions of reasoned judgment. His approach also permits
the Supreme Court to fashion a coherent set of unenumerated rights
that the Court deems fitting for our contemporary society, taking into
account the Court's best reading of relevant currents of America's
political-moral development. As a result, Souter's approach arguably
fares well under the criterion of functional justification-but only if
the Supreme Court in fact is able to make sound political-moral
judgments on this basis. Relatedly, the criterion of judicial objectivity
and competence presents a mixed picture. On the one hand, Souter
describes a reasoning process that approximates common law
decisionmaking. As compared to more abstract forms of reasoned
judgment, this methodology is one that judges might be relatively
competent to employ.359 On the other hand, this methodology is not
objective in any strong sense, certainly not as compared to the
approach of historical tradition, and it requires value judgments for
which the Court has no special expertise. Souter's approach also
founders under the criterion of majoritarian self-government. It is
one thing for courts to make common law decisions, which are subject
to legislative correction. It is quite another for them to create
unenumerated constitutional rights, immune from legislative
override, especially when these rights lack specific support in
historical or contemporary legislative policymaking.36°
Justice Souter presents and defends an attractive model of
reasoned judgment, describing a role for the Supreme Court that the
Court may be relatively competent to perform and that may serve
important functions. But the functional utility of this approach
ultimately depends on the Court's ability to make sound political-
moral judgments. In addition, this model raises serious questions of
judicial objectivity, and it undermines the principle of majoritarian
self-government. Souter's approach warrants serious consideration,
359. For arguments defending the common law method as a basis for constitutional
interpretation, see FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 96, at 152-56; David A. Strauss,
Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717 (2003);
David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877
(1996); Young, supra note 191, at 686-715.
360. 1 do not mean to exaggerate the countermajoritarian nature of Souter's approach,
which calls for a degree of judicial prudence and circumspection. Indeed, in Glucksberg
itself, Souter declined to recognize presumptive constitutional protection for the time
being, and he ultimately rejected the constitutional claim in question. See supra note 350
and accompanying text.
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but, on balance, like the theory of reasoned judgment more generally,
its weaknesses outweigh its strengths.
B. A Distinctive Theory of Evolving National Values
Although Souter's approach is actually a theory of reasoned
judgment, Harlan's "living tradition" language in Poe, coupled with
elements of the Court's analysis in Lawrence, can be read to suggest a
distinctive theory of substantive due process, a theory of evolving
national values. As I conceive this theory, it is considerably more
constrained than any version of the reasoned judgment approach.
Conversely, it is considerably more robust, and certainly more
dynamic, than the theory of historical tradition.
In my conception, the theory of evolving national values calls for
the Supreme Court, in Harlan's words, to identify "the balance struck
by this country '3 61 concerning particular issues of individual rights.
As under the theory of historical tradition, as elaborated in
Glucksberg,362 the Court should in each case define the constitutional
claim precisely and narrowly and then canvass American social and
legal history, from the past to the present, as it relates to this
particular claim. Unlike the theory of historical tradition, however,
the theory of evolving national values does not limit special
constitutional protection to claims that are "deeply rooted" in
American history. Instead, the critical question is whether the
asserted individual right has broad contemporary support in the
national culture. This contemporary support might be a continuation
of longstanding historical tradition. To this extent, the theory of
evolving national values encompasses the theory of historical
tradition. But the contemporary support might reflect a change from
the past. What matters is the current, evolved state of our national
culture, including especially our national legal culture, as it relates to
the specific issue at hand.
Only if broad contemporary national support exists for an
asserted individual right is the right eligible for special constitutional
protection. In this respect, the theory of evolving national values, like
that of historical tradition, depends upon an objectively determined,
external source of values. Also like the theory of historical tradition,
however, this theory demands an additional determination by the
Supreme Court. The Court must decide, as a matter of independent
normative judgment, whether the asserted right deserves national
361. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
362. See supra Part III.A.1.
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constitutional protection, thereby protecting the right even in states
that choose not to follow the general national pattern. In resolving
this question, the Court inevitably must employ a methodology
analogous to that required by the theory of reasoned judgment. It
must determine, in essence, whether the claim of right supported by
the national culture is a claim that warrants recognition as a matter of
political-moral reasoning. But the Court does not reach this second
question for claims of right that lack the requisite national support.
Although Lawrence did not expressly embrace the theory of
evolving national values, this theory is fully adequate to justify the
Court's decision, and it may help explain some of the Court's
reasoning. As discussed previously, the Court, focusing narrowly on
the precise constitutional claim before it, emphasized that American
social and legal history revealed a strong liberalizing trend with
respect to consensual sodomy.363 As a result, by the time of the
Court's decision, a substantial majority of the states had
decriminalized this practice, and enforcement was rare even in the
dwindling minority of states that continued to make it a crime. 364
Quite clearly, the asserted individual right, a right to engage in this
practice free from criminal sanction, satisfied the first requirement of
the theory of evolving national values. It had broad support in
contemporary American culture, including our national legal
culture-support that indicated societal and legal repudiation of the
history that had gone before. The states were not unanimous on this
score, but one could fairly describe the states' position as a general
consensus.
Likewise evident in the Court's opinion was its conclusion that
the asserted right also satisfied the second requirement of this theory.
Thus, the Court determined for itself, as a matter of political-moral
reasoning, that this right demanded and deserved national
constitutional protection. In support of this conclusion, the Court
provided its own explication of personal liberty, individual autonomy,
and self-definition;3 65 found that sodomy prohibitions impaired liberty
interests going well beyond the sexual practice directly at issue;3 66 and
concluded that the competing interest in traditional sexual morality
was inadequate to justify these intrusive criminal laws.3 67  As
explained earlier, this reasoning, taken by itself, is consistent with the
363. See supra Part IV.B.
364. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 570-73 (2003).
365. See id. at 558, 562, 573-74, 578-79.
366. See id. at 567, 575-76.
367. See id. at 571, 577-78.
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theory of reasoned judgment.36 Read in conjunction with the Court's
discussion of the states' contemporary treatment of this matter,
however, it also can be seen to reflect the second prong of the
evolving national values inquiry. Viewed in this light, the Court's
own political-moral reasoning confirmed the normative validity of the
general consensus that was present in American social and legal
culture.
There is precedent outside the area of substantive due process
for a comparable two-part analysis in the identification of
contemporary constitutional rights. In interpreting the Eighth
Amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual punishments," '369 the
Supreme Court "refer[s] to 'the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society' to determine which
punishments are so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual."37
Thus, as with substantive due process, the particular meaning of the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition may change over time. In capital
cases, the Court conducts a two-part inquiry.37" ' The Court first asks
whether "objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in
legislative enactments and state practice," '372  demonstrate a
contemporary "national consensus" 373 -not unanimity, but a general
consensus-against capital punishment in the context at hand.374 Such
a consensus supports a finding of unconstitutionality, but it does not
by itself require that result. Rather, if the Court concludes that there
is a consensus, it goes on "to bring its independent judgment to
bear." '375 If both the national consensus and the Supreme Court's
368. See supra Part IV.A.
369. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
370. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
371. In noncapital cases, the Court's approach is rather different and tends to be quite
deferential. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (rejecting an Eighth
Amendment challenge to a sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison under
California's "Three Strikes and You're Out" law). As the Court wrote in Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), "[o]utside the context of capital punishment, successful
challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare." Id.
at 272.
372. Roper, 543 U.S. at 563.
373. Id. at 564.
374. See id. at 564-67.
375. See id. at 574; see also id. at 564 (noting that the "objective indicia of consensus"
give the Court "essential instruction," after which "[wie then must determine, in the
exercise of our own independent judgment," whether the punishment is disproportionate).
As the Court has explained, "in cases involving a consensus, our own judgment is 'brought
to bear' by asking whether there is reason to disagree with the judgment reached by the
citizenry and its legislators." Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002) (citation
omitted).
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independent judgment indicate that the punishment of death is
disproportionate, it is deemed unconstitutional.376
The Court utilized this analysis in two recent death penalty cases.
In its 2002 decision in Atkins v. Virginia,37 7 the Court invalidated
capital punishment for mentally retarded offenders. Three years
later, in Roper v. Simmons,378 the Court followed suit with a
comparable ruling for juvenile offenders. Roper exemplifies the
Court's reasoning process,379 which was substantially similar in Atkins.
As the first step in its analysis in Roper, the Court examined
objective "evidence of national consensus against the death penalty
for juveniles.""38  The Court noted that a solid majority of the states-
thirty, including twelve that banned capital punishment
altogether 381-currently prohibited capital punishment for juvenile
offenders, and that actual executions were infrequent even in the
twenty states whose laws continued to authorize this practice.382
Departing from its 1989 decision in Stanford v. Kentucky,383 which had
upheld the juvenile death penalty,3s4 the Court concluded that
developments since Stanford, including a consistent trend favoring
abolition, revealed a national consensus that had not been present
when Stanford was decided.385
376. As I understand the Court's contemporary Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,
both elements are required before the death penalty can properly be declared
unconstitutional. Justice O'Connor has a somewhat different view. She agrees that the
Court must "weigh both the objective evidence of societal values and our own judgment."
Roper, 543 U.S. at 605 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But she has suggested that the Court's
own judgment, if sufficiently well supported, can justify a ruling of unconstitutionality
even in the absence of a genuine national consensus. See id. at 605-07. In fact, however, it
appears that the Court has never held the death penalty unconstitutionally
disproportionate without finding a national consensus in support of its decision. See id. at
615-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
377. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
378. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
379. To the extent that Lawrence and Roper can be seen to follow a similar
methodology, it is notable that Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion in each
case.
380. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
381. "[A] State's decision to bar the death penalty altogether," the Court explained,
"of necessity demonstrates a judgment that the death penalty is inappropriate for all
offenders, including juveniles." Id. at 574. But see id. at 611 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that states banning all executions are irrelevant to the existence of a "consensus
that offenders under 18 deserve special immunity from such a penalty").
382. See id. at 564-65 (majority opinion).
383. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
384. More precisely, the Court in Stanford had upheld the death penalty for juveniles
who were older than fifteen but younger than eighteen at the time of their offense. See id.
385. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-67.
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As the second step in its analysis, the Court forthrightly
examined for itself the political morality of the death penalty in this
context.386 Citing the immaturity of juveniles, their susceptibility to
negative outside influences, and their transient personalities, the
Court declared that " 'their irresponsible conduct is not as morally
reprehensible as that of an adult' "387 and that "[f]rom a moral
standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor
with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor's
character deficiencies will be reformed." '388 Turning to the State's
competing interests, the Court determined that the two social
purposes served by the death penalty, retribution and deterrence,
apply with lesser force to juveniles than to adults, because
"culpability or blameworthiness is diminished" and because juveniles
are "less susceptible to deterrence. ' 389  The Court found
"confirmation" of its judgment in the practices of other countries and
in international agreements, noting "the stark reality that the United
States is the only country in the world that continues to give official
sanction to the juvenile death penalty. '" 390
The Eighth Amendment ban on disproportionate punishments
serves different purposes than substantive due process,391 but the
Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is relevant by analogy.
Like substantive due process, it is based on "expansive language in
the Constitution, "392 and it generates constitutional meaning that may
change over time on the basis of evolving standards of political
morality. More specifically, the Court's Eighth Amendment analysis
in capital cases suggests the practicability, and perhaps the wisdom, of
a two-part inquiry in deciding the contemporary scope of
constitutional rights whose content is not tied to the original meaning
of the constitutional text. This analysis suggests that the Court's
discretion to recognize newly emerging constitutional rights-that is,
new restrictions on majoritarian government-should be limited by
386. See id. at 568-75.
387. Id. at 570 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (plurality
opinion)).
388. Id.
389. Id. at 571.
390. Id. at 575; see id. at 575-78.
391. In fact, when criminal punishment is at stake, the Eighth Amendment and
substantive due process might sometimes serve related purposes. Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 197-98 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) (rejecting substantive due process
protection for consensual sodomy, but suggesting that a prison sentence for such conduct
might violate the Eighth Amendment).
392. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.
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an external source of values, the pattern of contemporary laws and
practices in the various states. The Court's Eighth Amendment
reasoning also confirms the necessity of the Court's additional and
independent judgment, as a matter of political-moral reasoning.
More broadly, it suggests that only if a general societal consensus and
the Supreme Court's independent judgment are in agreement should
the Court recognize a national constitutional limitation, thereby
making the general consensus a matter of national uniformity.
C. Evaluating the Theory of Evolving National Values
Unlike the competing substantive due process theories of
historical tradition and reasoned judgment, the theory of evolving
national values has not been expressly embraced by the Court. As I
have explained, however, this theory is consistent with some of the
Supreme Court's opinion in Lawrence, and it is supported by
analogous reasoning in the Court's recent Eighth Amendment cases,
including Roper. Moreover, under the three criteria of evaluation I
identified previously,393 this theory appears to be superior, as a matter
of constitutional policy, to either of the Court's established
approaches.
Under my first two criteria-majoritarian self-government and
judicial objectivity and competence-the theory of evolving national
values, as I conceive it, is comparable to the theory of historical
tradition. As discussed earlier, that theory fares well under these
criteria.394 So, too, does the theory of evolving national values.
Like the theory of historical tradition, the theory of evolving
national values, properly understood, permits substantive due process
to operate in relative harmony with the principle of majoritarian self-
government. Thus, the Court's recognition of special liberties must
reflect "balance[s] struck by this country," '395 as indicated by broadly
supported national social patterns and legal policies. These patterns
and policies might or might not be "deeply rooted" historically, but
they must be widely supported in the contemporary United States,
and they must address the specific constitutional claim in question.
Only if the asserted individual right is supported by a general
consensus nationally will it be eligible for special constitutional
protection, special protection that may result in the invalidation of
legal policies falling outside the general consensus.
393. See supra Part II.
394. See supra Part III.A.2.
395. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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To more fully evaluate this theory under the criterion of
majoritarian self-government, it is important to clarify precisely how
the Supreme Court is to determine the existence of the required
national consensus. The most important indicium of the necessary
contemporary support is enacted legislation in the various states,
which is, of course, a product of majoritarian decisionmaking. As the
Court has noted in the analogous Eighth Amendment context, "the
'clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values
is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures,' ,396 in part
because " '[i]n a democratic society legislatures ... are constituted to
respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the
people.' ""' Also relevant are clear trends in recent legislation, as
noted in Lawrence and Roper, because they may help demonstrate or
confirm an emerging majoritarian consensus.398 Identifiable patterns
396. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302, 331 (1989)).
397. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175-76 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ.) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383 (1972) (Burger, CJ.,
dissenting)); see Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322-23 (Rehnquist, C., dissenting).
398. Congressional action, if it exists, is relevant as well. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005) (noting that despite a preexisting treaty reservation permitting
the United States to avoid a provision barring capital punishment for juveniles, Congress
in fact excluded juvenile offenders when it enacted the Federal Death Penalty Act of
1994). Indeed, if Congress has addressed the issue, one could argue that the congressional
action, in and of itself, should be sufficient to establish a national consensus. See
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., DECISION ACCORDING TO LAw 41 (1981) ("As to issues of
national consensus, the presumption has to be that Congress is the empowered voice.").
But giving conclusive weight to congressional policymaking for the federal sphere (in the
absence of a congressional decision to preempt or displace state policymaking on the
issue) would be insufficiently attentive to the values of federalism in this context. At least
for political-moral questions of the sort addressed by substantive due process, multiple
decentralized decisions might well be more probative of a genuine national consensus than
a single act of the national legislature. Cf. McConnell, supra note 87, at 682 (arguing, in
the context of a tradition-based approach to substantive due process, that the decisions of
decentralized institutions are critical and that "[n]o single vote, no single electoral victory,
no single jurisdiction suffices").
Within the limits of congressional power, of course, Congress could pass federal
legislation preempting or displacing state law to the contrary. Such legislation could
create a federal statutory right, eliminating the need for a constitutional claim, or it could
have the opposite effect, putting an end to state law experimentation that otherwise, over
time, might lead to a national consensus favoring the recognition of a constitutional right.
In the context of physician-assisted suicide, for example, the Supreme Court recently ruled
that the Federal Controlled Substances Act cannot be construed to displace state law
protection of the right to physician-assisted suicide, but the Court also suggested that
Congress, if it so desired, would have the constitutional power to preclude (or,
presumably, to permit) physician-assisted suicide nationwide. See Gonzales v. Oregon,
126 S. Ct. 904, 923-24 (2006). See generally Lawrence G. Sager, Cool Federalism and the
Life-Cycle of Moral Progress, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1385 (2005) (suggesting that the
structure of American federalism can facilitate moral progress on matters of individual
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of actual enforcement or nonenforcement of the law-also mentioned
in Lawrence and Roper-are relevant as well, because these patterns
reflect the decisions of electorally accountable prosecutors and of
citizens themselves, acting as jurors.399 Far less significant is more
general evidence of an American societal consensus, including
prevailing social practices, the announced positions of professional
and social organizations, and the results of public opinion surveys.4°°
But such evidence might be useful to some extent, for example, to
confirm a conclusion that is supported by the more reliable indicators
as well.
Other potential data, although mentioned by the Court in
Lawrence and Roper, is irrelevant to the issue of a majoritarian
American consensus. In particular, rulings of state courts applying
state constitutional law should not count for this purpose, because
they are not majoritarian. 40 1 Foreign and international legal policies
and judicial rulings are likewise irrelevant to the existence of a
majoritarian consensus in the United States.4 2 As the late Chief
Justice Rehnquist observed, "if it is evidence of a national consensus
for which we are looking, then the viewpoints of other countries
simply are not relevant.
40 3
In determining whether a national consensus exists, the Court
should focus on sources of evidence that are relevant and reliable and
that reflect majoritarian judgments. More precisely, it should focus
right-from state experimentation to wider acceptance and eventual nationwide
recognition-but only in the absence of premature federal intervention).
399. Although not pertinent in Lawrence or Roper, in appropriate cases the Court may
also consult prevailing common law doctrine, which, being subject to legislative control,
reflects majoritarian acquiescence even if not explicit majoritarian support.
400. In the Eighth Amendment context, compare Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (citing
polling data and the views of religious and professional organizations, among other data,
as evidence "lend[ing] further support" to the Court's conclusion about a national
consensus), with id. at 321-28 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that this sort of data
should not be considered at all and that the Court should confine its inquiry to legislative
enactments and jury decisions).
401. Unlike common law rulings, state constitutional rulings are not subject to
majoritarian control or correction through the ordinary legislative process. And even if
the state court judges are elected or electorally accountable, they are judicial actors
deciding judicial questions. They are not political decisionmakers setting majoritarian
policy.
402. When I speak here of international legal policies, I mean international legal
policies that the U.S. government has not itself adopted or accepted.
403. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). One could argue to the
contrary, contending that majoritarian decisionmakers in the United States might tend to
follow foreign or international trends. But an inference of this sort would be highly
speculative, to put it mildly. As a result, foreign and international data should not
contribute to the Court's resolution of this question.
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primarily on legislative enactments and on patterns of enforcement or
nonenforcement. If the Court properly confines its consensus
analysis in this fashion, the theory of evolving national values satisfies
my first criterion, at least to a substantial degree, because it limits the
recognition of unenumerated rights to rights that are broadly
supported by the American people and their elected representatives.
The theory of evolving national values, so understood, also
fulfills my second criterion, that of judicial objectivity and
competence. To be sure, one component of the Supreme Court's
decisionmaking under this theory is largely unconstrained and open-
ended. Thus, under the second part of its two-part inquiry, the Court
cannot recognize an unenumerated right unless it concludes, on the
basis of its own political-moral judgment, that the right warrants
constitutional protection. But as we have seen, such an independent
normative judgment is inevitably a part of every theory of substantive
due process, including even the restrictive theory of historical
tradition.4 °4 What matters is that under the theory of evolving
national values, the Court's own political-moral judgment is not
sufficient to justify the recognition of an unenumerated right, because
the Court does not exercise its own judgment unless it first
determines, objectively, that there is a contemporary national
consensus favoring the particular constitutional claim before it. To
this extent, at least, the Court's task is that "of a translator, the
reading of signs and symbols given from without."4"5
Satisfaction of the requirement of a national consensus is
objectively determined, but this requirement is not clear cut. In the
first place, the Court must define the claim of right. As I have
explained in discussing the approach of historical tradition, the Court
must define the claim narrowly enough to reflect its salient political-
moral components, and this determination requires a measure of
judicial discernment.40 6 The Court then must decide whether there
exists a sufficient national consensus-and therefore a majoritarian
sanction-for this particular claim.
The basic standard is that of a general consensus, not unanimity
or even near-unanimity. At the same time, the Supreme Court's
analysis in Lawrence and in its recent Eighth Amendment decisions
suggests that this standard ordinarily requires, at a minimum,
404. See supra text accompanying notes 181-85.
405. See CARDOZO, supra note 98, at 174.
406. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
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supportive legislative enactments in a solid majority of the states. °7
How substantial the majority must be in any given case may depend
on the existence of other evidence of a national consensus, including
legislative trends and patterns of enforcement or nonenforcement. If
these trends and patterns are mixed or unclear, the Court should
hesitate to recognize a national consensus, because it should be
convinced that such a consensus will be enduring.48 Given these
ambiguities, the determination of a national consensus is likely to
divide the Justices in close cases. In Roper, for instance, five Justices
found a sufficient national consensus against the juvenile death
penalty, but four did not.0 9 Indeed, the Justices may not even agree
on the nature or significance of particular legislative judgments.
Roper once again provides an example. The Court's five-Justice
majority found that thirty states, a substantial majority, had adopted
legislative enactments against the juvenile death penalty, but this
number included twelve states that had abolished capital punishment
altogether.410 Three of the four dissenting Justices would not have
counted these twelve states, claiming that legislative decisions to
407. One could argue that there should be a higher and more specific threshold of
legislative support. For example, one might attempt to approximate the formal
requirement for a constitutional amendment, as set forth in Article V of the Constitution,
by demanding supportive enactments in three-fourths of the states. Cf McConnell, supra
note 87, at 682 (defending a tradition-based approach to substantive due process, in part
on the ground that longstanding traditions, like formally adopted constitutional provisions,
can be seen to reflect the decisions of "a supermajority of the people, expressed through
decentralized institutions"). See generally U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring that proposed
constitutional amendments be ratified by three-fourths of the states). Such an alternative
formulation would more fully honor my first two criteria of evaluation-majoritarian self-
government and judicial objectivity and competence. But it would substantially limit the
functional utility of substantive due process, thereby undermining the strength of this
theory under my third and final criterion. See infra text accompanying notes 416-31.
408. One could imagine a more constrained version of the theory of evolving national
values, one that would move the theory closer to that of historical tradition. According to
this variation, the Court could not properly find a sufficient contemporary consensus
unless the consensus had already endured-that is, been in place and become stable-for
some period of years (even if not for the duration required for a "deeply rooted" historical
tradition). Cf McConnell, supra note 87, at 690 (arguing that the Court should not
constitutionalize a right under substantive due process unless "a stable national consensus
has emerged and persisted"). Under my criteria of evaluation, the effect of this variation
would be comparable to the effect of requiring a higher and more specific threshold of
legislative support. See supra note 407.
409. Compare Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564-67 (2005) (majority opinion)
(finding a national consensus), with id. at 594-98 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the evidence of a national consensus was weak), and id. at 608-15 (Scalia, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting the existence of a national
consensus).
410. See id. at 564, 574 (majority opinion); see also supra note 381 and accompanying
text.
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completely abolish the death penalty do not bear on the more specific
question of whether juveniles should be exempted from any such
punishment.41' This analysis contributed to their conclusion that
there was no national consensus on this point.4 12
Although it does not provide a bright-line test, the requirement
of a contemporary national consensus does provide an objective
standard that limits the Supreme Court's discretion in a meaningful
way. The Court's analysis of the consensus question is directed to the
specific issue at hand, and it depends mainly upon the Court's
examination of legislative enactments, legislative trends, and patterns
of actual enforcement or nonenforcement. The Court's inquiry is
narrowly focused and would appear to fall well within the judicial
ken. Despite ambiguities at the margin, the consensus requirement is
capable of principled and consistent application-at least to the same
degree as countless other legal standards. The theory of evolving
national values certainly does not leave the Justices "free to roam
where unguided speculation might take them." '413 Rather, it includes
an objective standard, "given from without, 414 complete with
" 'guideposts for responsible decisionmaking' that direct and restrain
[the Court's] exposition of the Due Process Clause."4 5
Turning to my third criterion of evaluation, the question is
whether the theory of evolving national values provides a
contemporary, functional justification for the Supreme Court's
substantive due process decisionmaking. Under the theory of
historical tradition, as we have seen, substantive due process serves a
nationalizing function, a conserving function, and a Burkean
function. 6 Under the theory of reasoned judgment, by contrast, the
nationalizing function of substantive due process is combined with a
liberty-maximizing function.4 7 If my earlier analysis is correct, the
functional justification for substantive due process is relatively weak
under the theory of historical tradition, because that theory severely
restricts the role of substantive due process in contemporary
governance. Under the theory of reasoned judgment, by contrast, the
functional justification argument is potentially quite strong, due to the
411. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 610-11 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas,
J., dissenting).
412. See id. at 608-11.
413. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
414. CARDOZO, supra note 98, at 174.
415. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Collins v. Harker
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
416. See supra Part III.A.2.
417. See supra Part III.B.2.
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liberty-maximizing function that it posits. But this argument depends
upon the Supreme Court's independent ability to resolve hotly
contested questions of political morality, which in turn reveals the
more obvious weaknesses of this theory under my other two
criteria-majoritarian self-government and judicial objectivity and
competence. My argument here is that the theory of evolving
national values steers between the extremes of the other theories,
providing a strong functional justification for substantive due process
even as it satisfies my other criteria as well. As I will explain, this
theory's functional justification for substantive due process rests on
three distinct but interrelated functions.
First, like the other theories, the theory of evolving national
values allows substantive due process to serve a nationalizing
function. Moreover, given the requirements of this theory, the
propriety of the nationalizing function is not defeated or undermined
by the competing argument in favor of state-by-state policymaking.
The competing argument depends on the claim that state-by-state
policymaking can honor divergent majoritarian preferences and
therefore potentially can achieve a more stable, albeit diverse,
resolution of the issue in question. As discussed previously, that
argument is strong in the context of the reasoned judgment
approach,418 but under the theory of evolving national values, the
Court's recognition of national constitutional rights is restricted to
rights that are already supported by a national consensus among the
states. Although the Court must exercise its independent judgment
as well, it is not creating national norms in the face of widespread
disagreement. Instead, the Court's recognition of a substantive due
process right has the effect of consolidating what is already the
dominant approach. In the absence of unanimity, federalism still is
impaired to a degree. Under this theory of substantive due process,
however, the Court's recognition of a constitutional right is likely not
only to honor the majoritarian preferences of most Americans but
also to effect a stable and enduring resolution of the issue at hand.
Second, substantive due process under this theory serves a
progressive function. According to this theory, the political-moral
wisdom of the Supreme Court's recognition of an unenumerated
constitutional right is supported not only by the Court's own
judgment, but also by the contemporary national consensus. Thus,
unlike the backward-looking philosophy that undergirds the theory of
historical tradition, this theory posits a more forward-looking,
418. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
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progressive evolution of political morality, which seems more
appropriate and fitting for the United States. Indeed, the idea of
progress, including political-moral progress, is a core element-
perhaps a constitutive element-of American society and political
culture. As Professor Michael J. Perry has written, America's self-
understanding includes a longstanding commitment "to the notion of
moral evolution," according to which we seek "to bring our collective
(political) practice into ever closer harmony with our evolving,
deepening moral understanding." '419 In addressing questions of
political morality, we learn from the past, sometimes reaffirming
"deeply rooted" historical teachings 420 but sometimes moving in new
directions.4 21 These new directions may reflect, as the Court found in
Lawrence, an "emerging awareness" of the proper scope of individual
liberty.422 When societal thinking changes to the point of creating a
national consensus, no less than when a national consensus is
longstanding, there is reason to believe that the liberty embraced by
that consensus is worthy of recognition as a matter of political
morality-perhaps not universally, but at least in the contemporary
United States.423
419. MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE
JUDICIARY 99 (1982). See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970) (discussing the idea of progress and offering a critical
account of its role in the Warren Court's constitutional decisionmaking).
420. To the extent that a contemporary consensus is longstanding-that is, sufficiently
"deeply rooted" to justify recognition of a constitutional right even under the theory of
historical tradition-the progressive function of substantive due process can be seen to
include a Burkean component. But the function here is nonetheless "progressive" in the
sense that the presumptive political morality of the national consensus is grounded not in
its historical pedigree, but rather in the support it finds in contemporary society.
421. See Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 204 (1993) ("Our
heritage is as much about breaking with tradition as it is about following tradition.").
422. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
423. This argument presupposes an aspirational understanding of the Constitution,
according to which constitutional interpretation is "responsive to our people's actual and
evolving aspirations." See Richard B. Saphire, Originalism and the Importance of
Constitutional Aspirations, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 663 (1997). According to the
theory of evolving national values, however, it is not for the Supreme Court alone to
determine the meaning and significance of our constitutional aspirations, at least not in the
context of unenumerated rights. Instead, the Court must search initially for a
contemporary national consensus. See id. at 662 (arguing that the Constitution should be
read to include "the values and aspirations that.., we present-day Americans 'as a people
hold to be fundamental' " (quoting Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79
MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1042 (1981))).
One might go further than my argument would permit, contending that even if a
national consensus has yet to emerge, the Supreme Court should be permitted to advance
our constitutional aspirations by acting in furtherance of a developing pattern of evolving
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Finally, the theory of evolving national values permits
substantive due process to serve a liberty-enhancing function. Under
the theory of reasoned judgment, substantive due process works more
aggressively to maximize liberty. The theory of evolving national
values, by contrast, does not permit the Supreme Court to maximize
liberty to the same extent, because the Court is constrained by the
requirement of a contemporary national consensus. Even so,
substantive due process under this theory does work to enhance
liberty, certainly as compared to the theory of historical tradition.
Moreover, the theory of evolving national values allows and
encourages the Court to consult and elaborate a libertarian
philosophy of individual rights, albeit only to the extent that this
perspective is supported by the requisite national consensus.
Under the theory of evolving national values, the Supreme
Court's philosophical inquiry occurs at the second stage of its
substantive due process analysis, when it is determining for itself
whether an asserted individual right warrants protection as a matter
of political morality. At this stage, the Court is free to enunciate, as it
did in Lawrence, its own understanding of personal liberty. The
Court could take a restrictive view of liberty and a broad view of
governmental power, but it should not. Instead, the Court should
employ-as it did in Lawrence-libertarian reasoning of essentially
the same sort that it would utilize under the theory of reasoned
judgment.
Recall my earlier discussion of the theory of reasoned
judgment.424 There, I argued that the functional justification for that
approach rests on a libertarian philosophy that is plausible and
attractive as a general constitutional philosophy of individual rights.
According to this philosophy, the Supreme Court begins with a
presumptive "right to be let alone," at least with respect to personal
decisions that implicate important dimensions of individual autonomy
and self-definition. In conducting its political-moral evaluation, the
Court also considers additional, more specific individual interests, and
it addresses competing governmental interests as well. The
presumption favoring liberty, however, leads the Court to disfavor
governmental paternalism, especially if the government is attempting
merely to advance an interest in personal morality. More tangible
political morality-at least if the Court's decision is later vindicated, post hoc, by the
development of an appropriate consensus. Cf. BICKEL, supra note 95, at 239 ("[Tlhe
Court should declare as law only such principles as will-in time, but in a rather
immediate foreseeable future-gain general assent.").
424. See supra Part III.B.2.
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governmental interests may warrant accommodation, but only if they
outweigh the presumptively protected individual interest.
I ultimately concluded that this libertarian philosophy, however
plausible and attractive, was inadequate to justify substantive due
process in accordance with the reasoned judgment model-in part
because this philosophy is not beyond challenge and in part because
the theory of reasoned judgment falters under my other criteria of
evaluation. Under the theory of evolving national values, by contrast,
the same type of libertarian philosophy moves from the plausible to
the persuasive. More precisely, it is sufficiently persuasive to justify
its use by the Supreme Court at the second stage of its substantive
due process analysis.
A libertarian philosophy is appropriate here precisely because
this theory of substantive due process includes its initial requirement
of a contemporary national consensus. That requirement permits the
theory of evolving national values to satisfy my other criteria of
evaluation, eliminating competing arguments for rejecting a
libertarian approach that is otherwise attractive. In addition, the
required consensus provides more specific support for the Court's use
of a libertarian approach, including a presumption favoring liberty, in
deciding the particular case before it. After all, the Court does not
employ its own judgment unless there is a contemporary national
consensus-a majoritarian consensus-favoring the protection of
liberty in the situation at hand. As the Court has written in the
analogous Eighth Amendment context, the question at this stage is
"whether there is reason to disagree with the judgment reached by
the citizenry and its legislators." '425 Accordingly, there are two
reasons for the Court to begin its independent analysis with a
presumption favoring liberty: a general libertarian philosophy that
can be justified under the theory of evolving national values, and a
national consensus favoring liberty in the specific context at hand.
In elaborating and explaining its own independent judgment, the
Supreme Court thus is free to invoke a libertarian philosophy, and it
is well advised to do so. Moreover, the Court is free at this stage to
consult whatever authorities it finds persuasive. More specifically, it
may consult state constitutional rulings as well as foreign and
international policies and judicial decisions-not to support the
existence of a national majoritarian consensus, but instead to confirm
the Court's independent judgment that this consensus is sound as a
matter of political morality. Viewed in this light, the Court's reliance
425. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002).
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on these sorts of decisions and policies in Lawrence4 26 was not only
unobjectionable but also salutary, and the same can be said for the
Court's use of foreign materials in the Eighth Amendment context, as
in Roper.427
The requirement of a national consensus restricts the Supreme
Court's freedom to fashion a coherent pattern of unenumerated
rights, because some rights that might logically follow from others
undoubtedly will lack the requisite consensus. Even so, the Court's
political-moral reasoning, within the limits of the consensus
requirement, can provide a reasoned elaboration of liberty. The
Court's elaboration, in turn, may have a broader effect on the
American polity by influencing-without dictating-the majoritarian
resolution of separate but related questions. In Lawrence, for
example, the Court carefully reserved the issue of same-sex
marriage, 42 but its analysis of the liberty of homosexual couples
426. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-73, 576-77.
427. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005). For contrary views, see
Roger P. Alford, Roper v. Simmons and Our Constitution in International Equipoise, 53
UCLA L. REV. 1, 16 (2005) (criticizing the Court's reliance on foreign practice as a
"benchmark for the correctness of its conception of what human dignity requires"); Joan
L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a "Wider Civilization": Lawrence and the
Rehnquist Court's Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic Constitutional
Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1293-97, 1301-26 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme
Court's substantive use of foreign and international law as a matter of "moral fact-finding"
is without constitutional justification).
Although I do not share their particular conclusions, Professors Alford and
Larsen each highlight an important point that is sometimes overlooked: whether the use
of foreign and international law is appropriate in domestic constitutional interpretation
depends upon the use to which it is put, along with the theory or method of constitutional
interpretation to which it is linked. See Alford, supra; Larsen, supra. For additional
commentary emphasizing this linkage, see Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for
Constitutional Comparativism, 52 UCLA L. REV. 639 (2005); Mark Tushnet, The
Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999). For a
revealing debate between Justices Scalia and Breyer, highlighting the influence of their
divergent theories of constitutional interpretation, see The Relevance of Foreign Legal
Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and
Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 519 (2005).
Interestingly enough, one type of international law, the customary international
law of human rights, itself evolves over time and calls for judicial decisionmaking that is
comparable in some respects to that required under the substantive due process theory of
evolving national values. See generally Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731-38
(2004) (sanctioning private claims under the Alien Tort Statute based on customary
international law, but holding that such a claim is permitted only when it is supported by
an international consensus on the particular issue at hand, defined at an appropriate level
of specificity).
428. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 ("The present case. . . does not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons
seek to enter.").
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certainly supports the argument that this liberty should be extended
to include the right to marry.429 At present, the Court could not
properly declare a right to same-sex marriage, because there is no
national consensus favoring such a right.43° Influenced in part by the
Court, however, policymakers might ultimately move in this
direction, eventually creating a national consensus that would support
the recognition of an additional unenumerated right.431
In summary, the theory of evolving national values satisfies each
of my three criteria of evaluation. The requirement of a
contemporary national consensus permits substantive due process to
operate in relative harmony with the principle of majoritarian self-
government, and it constrains the Court's discretion in a manner that
429. See Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex
Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1184, 1208-21 (2004);
Tribe, supra note 9, at 1945-51.
430. As of yet, there is nothing approaching a contemporary national consensus
favoring a right to same-sex marriage, nor even a right to comparable legal benefits in the
form of civil union. Much to the contrary, recent legislation and state constitutional
amendments have created a pattern of state laws-the best evidence of a national
consensus-that clearly rejects such claims in favor of the maintenance of traditional,
heterosexual marriage. Just one state, Massachusetts, has recognized same-sex marriage,
and it acted only under the mandate of a state court invoking state constitutional law. See
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). Vermont and
Connecticut have recognized a right to same-sex civil union, but Vermont, like
Massachusetts, acted under the compulsion of a state court decision relying on state
constitutional law. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). In New Jersey, the State
supreme court, following the lead of Vermont, recently declared that state constitutional
law does not require same-sex marriage but does require the New Jersey Legislature to
recognize same-sex civil union. See Lewis v. Harris, No. A-68-05 (N.J. Oct. 25, 2006). A
handful of other states have enacted legislation providing same-sex couples with some of
the benefits of marriage. At present, however, states giving same-sex couples any form of
legal recognition are in a distinct minority. By contrast, an overwhelming majority of the
states restrict marriage and its legal benefits to heterosexual couples. The Human Rights
Campaign helpfully documents, catalogs, and maps the laws of all fifty states on its web
site. See Human Rights Campaign, Your Community Homepage, http://www.hrc.org
(follow "Laws in Your State" hyperlink; then follow "Statewide Marriage Laws" and
"Relationship Recognition in the U.S." hyperlinks) (last visited Nov. 29, 2006). Congress
has expressed a view similar to most of the states, declaring that for federal law purposes
marriage is confined to its traditional definition. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No.
104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000)).
431. This is not to deny that in the aftermath of Lawrence, there was a broad political
backlash against same-sex marriage. See supra note 430. The greater part of this backlash,
however, arose not so much from Lawrence as from other developments, including
especially the subsequent decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
Goodridge, which directly mandated legal recognition of same-sex marriage on the basis
of state constitutional law. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and
Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 459-82 (2005). In any event, the long-term political
prospects for same-sex marriage are considerably more favorable than the short-term
political environment might suggest. See id. at 484-86.
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honors the criterion of judicial objectivity and competence. This
requirement prevents substantive due process from maximizing
liberty, but it permits the enhancement of liberty, in part through the
Supreme Court's elaboration of a libertarian philosophy in its
independent evaluation of the asserted individual right. At the same
time, substantive due process serves a progressive function that
honors America's self-understanding, and it nationalizes rights that
warrant constitutional recognition at that level.4 3
2
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have described and analyzed three competing
theories of substantive due process: historical tradition, reasoned
judgment, and evolving national values. In evaluating each theory, I
have utilized three criteria, reflecting relevant considerations of
constitutional policy: majoritarian self-government, judicial
objectivity and competence, and functional justification. As we have
seen, each theory has support in the Supreme Court's contemporary
doctrine, and each can be defended as a matter of constitutional
policy. On the basis of my analysis, however, I have concluded that
the most appealing theory, on balance, is the theory of evolving
national values. Under this theory, the Supreme Court should
recognize an unenumerated right if but only if the right-defined
narrowly and with precision-is supported both by a contemporary
national consensus and by the Court's independent political-moral
judgment.
If my argument is sound,433 the Supreme Court should adopt the
theory of evolving national values as a general theory for resolving
substantive due process claims, and it should reject the competing
theories. In so doing, the Court would clarify and rationalize its
432. For the reasons discussed in the text, the evolving national values approach is
superior to that of reasoned judgment as a matter of constitutional policy. It may also be
more consistent with practical limitations on the judiciary's ability to generate social
change. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 338 (1991) (concluding that the courts, including the Supreme
Court, "can almost never be effective producers of significant social reform" and that "[alt
best, they can second the social reform acts of the other branches of government"); cf. id.
("A court's contribution ... is akin to officially recognizing the evolving state of affairs,
more like the cutting of the ribbon on a new project than its construction."). For helpful
commentary, see Symposium, The Role of Courts in Social Change, 54 DRAKE L. REV.
791 (2006).
433. Needless to say, I believe that my argument is sound, but I make no claim that it is
irresistible. Reasonable observers, or reasonable Justices, might embrace any of the three
theories that I have described, depending on how they weigh and apply my criteria of
evaluation.
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substantive due process doctrine. Although the theory would be new,
it would not necessarily undermine the Court's existing body of
precedents. As we have seen, Lawrence v. Texas434 is easy to justify
under this theory.435 Moreover, many of the Court's prior holdings
(as opposed to its reasoning) could also be explained in a manner
consistent with this approach. In Griswold v. Connecticut,436 for
example, there clearly was a contemporary national consensus
supporting the right of married couples to use contraceptives.437 A
similar consensus, supported by state laws and other relevant
evidence, might also be found for other family-related and parental
rights that the Court has recognized. 438 Likewise, the right to refuse
medical treatment, as discussed in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health,4 39 was supported by a contemporary consensus
as well as historical tradition, because the historical tradition had
continued to the present. 440  Conversely, in Washington v.
Glucksberg,441 there was no contemporary national consensus
favoring a right to physician-assisted suicide,"2 and the Court's
rejection of that claim therefore was proper under this theory.
Other precedents would be difficult or impossible to explain
under the theory of evolving national values, but they might be
reaffirmed nonetheless on the basis of stare decisis. The Supreme
Court's 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade,"3 for example, plainly was not
supported by a national consensus.4 Perhaps there was a national
consensus favoring the more moderate approach that the Court
adopted two decades later in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,445  or perhaps not. By prematurely
constitutionalizing the right to abortion in Roe, the Court preempted
434. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
435. See supra Part V.B.
436. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
437. See Sunstein, supra note 329, at 27 (noting that Griswold, like Lawrence,
invalidated "a law that had become hopelessly out of touch with existing social
convictions"). Indeed, as Justice Harlan explained in his opinion anticipating Griswold,
the challenged Connecticut statute was uniquely intrusive on personal privacy and liberty,
compared to other state and federal laws, in that Connecticut stood alone in making it a
crime to use-rather than to distribute--contraceptives. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
554 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
438. See supra Part I.
439. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
440. See id. at 269-70.
441. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
442. See id. at 716-19.
443. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
444. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
445. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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state legislatures and thereby deprived itself of the best evidence of a
national consensus, the pattern of freely adopted state legislation.446
As a result, the case for a consensus favoring the Casey approach-
either at the time of the Casey decision or today-would necessarily
rest on much less reliable evidence, such as public opinion surveys.
Evidence of this type, standing alone, generally is not enough to
support the finding of a national consensus. Yet one might argue that
such evidence, however unreliable, could support the reaffirmation of
Casey when combined with the force of stare decisis. Or perhaps
stare decisis alone would justify this result. Concededly, the right to
abortion would be something of an anomaly under the theory of
evolving national values, but stare decisis has its own power. 448
Indeed, if one accepts the Court's analysis in Casey,"9 stare decisis has
special force in this context.450
446. Cf Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185,
1208 (1992) ("[Tihe Court, through constitutional adjudication, can reinforce or signal a
green light for a social change.... Roe, on the other hand, halted a political process that
was moving in a reform direction and thereby, I believe, prolonged divisiveness and
deferred stable settlement of the issue.").
447. Cf James G. Wilson, The Role of Public Opinion in Constitutional Interpretation,
1.993 BYU L. REV. 1037, 1137-38 (suggesting, shortly after the Court's decision, that
Casey reflected a compromise that might prove acceptable to most Americans).
448. On the role of stare decisis as a source of constitutional legitimacy, see Fallon,
supra note 83, at 1821-24.
449. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-69.
450. The Supreme Court may revisit the role of stare decisis in pending cases
challenging the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117
Stat. 1201 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. IV 2004)). See Gonzales v.
Carhart, 126 S. Ct. 1314 (2006) (mem.) (granting certiorari to review Carhart v. Gonzales,
413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005)); Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc., 126 S.
Ct. 2901 (2006) (mem.) (granting certiorari to review Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am.,
Inc., v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006)). The Act provides no exception for
women facing non-life-threatening health risks, and, as the lower courts held, it therefore
would seem unconstitutional under the precedent of Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914
(2000). But the pending challenges raise a number of issues, including the question of
appropriate relief, leaving various resolutions open to the Court. Cf Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of N. New Eng., 126 S. Ct. 961 (2006) (remanding a challenge to a parental
notification law that lacked an explicit exception for emergency abortions for minors
facing health risks, with the Court suggesting that the constitutional defect might be cured
by a more narrow remedy than invalidation of the law in its entirety); id. at 969 (noting
that the Court had approved a complete invalidation of the "partial birth abortion" statute
in Stenberg, but observing that "the parties in Stenberg did not ask for, and we did not
contemplate, relief more finely drawn"); Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278
(2d Cir. 2006) (concluding that the federal lartial-Birth Abortion Ban Act is
unconstitutional, but deferring the question of remedy, with the court noting the potential
impact of Ayotte and inviting the submission of supplemental briefs).
Even if the Supreme Court does repudiate or limit Stenberg in the pending cases,
its reasoning is likely to reflect the view that "partial birth abortion" is morally distinctive,
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In any event, my argument looks mainly to the future. It is
designed to inform the Supreme Court's consideration of claims
urging the recognition of a new unenumerated right-perhaps a right
to same-sex marriage, or a right to engage in reproductive cloning, or
a right that we cannot as yet imagine.451 In cases such as these, the
theory of evolving national values would require the Court to find a
contemporary national consensus favoring the asserted right before
conducting its own political-moral evaluation. This theory would
reject a narrow focus on historical tradition, but it also would reject
the approach of reasoned judgment, which champions an unduly
expansive role for the Court. The theory of evolving national values
would countenance the notion of a living Constitution, one that
protects unenumerated rights that emerge over time. The
Constitution's evolving set of unenumerated rights, however, would
be a product not merely of the Court's own judgment, but also of
majoritarian actions that would provide the Court with an external
standard of decision. This theory would permit the Court to enhance
liberty and to advance a progressive understanding of the
Constitution. At the same time, it would confine the Justices to an
appropriate judicial role. After all, they are judges. They are not
"knight[s]-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of [their] own ideal of
beauty or of goodness. 452
justifying a distinctive legal response. As a result, the Court's decisions are unlikely to
threaten the general doctrinal approach of Casey.
451. Some or all such claims, of course, might be couched in terms of equal protection
as well as substantive due process. My focus in this Article is substantive due process, not
equal protection, but my argument might have implications for equal protection as well.
Cf City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 466 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (contending that evolving
societal values, as embodied and reflected in patterns of legislation, should inform the
Court's equal protection decisionmaking). In any event, when it comes to the recognition
of a newly emerging, nonoriginalist constitutional right, I seriously doubt that an equal
protection claim should prevail when a substantive due process claim would not. Cf
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (rejecting an equal protection argument for physician-
assisted suicide, with the Court's decision resting heavily on its substantive due process
ruling in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)). But cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual
Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and
Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161 (1988) (contending that equal protection is a
more potent constitutional weapon than substantive due process, one that is designed to
invalidate discriminatory practices even if they are supported by longstanding and
continuing traditions).
452. CARDOZO, supra note 98, at 141.
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